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I. Introduction.
The standard economic intuition regarding private provision of public goods has been largely
verified by a series of recent papers on the subject. Warr [1983], Palfrey and Rosenthal [1984,
1985], Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian [1986], Andreoni [1985], and others have analyzed games in
which citizens freely contribute towards the provision of a public good.' Confirming the standard
view of the free rider problem, the equilibria of these contributions games typically have inefficient
outcomes-specifically, not enough of the public good is provided.
By contrast, the literature on full implementation has demonstrated the existence of games for
which all equilibria are efficient.2 Given this fact, why is it supposed that the agents in the economy
play a game which has an inefficient equilibrium? Presumably, the games used to model private
provision are taken to be "natural" representations of private provision, while the games used in
the implementation literature are not viewed this way. The games used to prove existence of games
with efficient outcomes generally seem to require a social planner to impose and to "mediate" them.
That is, they do not seem to be reasonable descriptions of games which would arise "naturally."
Contrary to this conclusion, we will provide an example of an efficient mechanism which appears
to be a very natural contribution game. In the simplest version of this example, we consider a
complete information economy with a single private good and a discrete public good. The simple
game that we consider is to allow each agent to voluntarily contribute any non-negative amount
of the private good he chooses. The public good is provided if contributions are sufficient to pay
for it and the contributions are refunded otherwise. Surprisingly, the set of equilibrium outcomes
of this game (where the equilibrium notion is a slight modification of perfection) is exactly the
core of the economy. We extend the game to the case of a public good that can take on finitely
many values and prove essentially the same result. Since this extension works for any finite number
of values for the public good, we can reinterpret the finite case as approximating the case where
the public good can take on any value in a continuum. It is straightforward to show that as the
increment between values (the "step size") goes to zero, the outcome converges to the core of the
economy where the public good can take on any value in the continuum. Interestingly, as the step
size goes to zero, the game form converges (in an appropriate sense) to a repeated version of the
game considered by Bergstrom. Blume, and Varian. We analyze the set of equilibrium outcomes of
1 Related papers include Bliss and Nalebuff [1985], Cornes and Sandier [1985a, 1985b], Sudgen [1985], Bernheim [1986],
and Bernheim and Bagwell [1985].
2 See Maskin [1977], Moore and Repullo [1986], and Palfrey and Srivastava [1986].
1
the game at the limit and demonstrate some interesting differences between the limiting outcomes
and the outcomes at the limit. This provides an intriguing view of the role of discontinuities in the
game form, a point noted in a different context by Aghion [1985].
In the next section, we set out the model and give definitions. In Section III, we consider the
simplest case where the set of social decisions is {O, 1 }, which we interpret as choosing whether
or not to build a streetlight. We show that the simple game described above fully implements
the core. In Section IV, we extend these results to the case where the set of social decisions is
{0, 1,... , M} for some finite M. We interpret this case as the choice of the number of streetlights
to build. This analysis extends trivially to the case where the decision set is {0,6,2,... , M(F) }
where 6 > 0 and M(6) is the largest multiple of 6 less than or equal to M. Viewing this decision set
as an approximation of f0, M;, this fact gives us a way to approximately fully implement the core.
The properties of our game as S j 0 are immediate. In Section V, we formalize this and analyze the
game at 6 = 0. In Section VI, we offer some concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
II. The Economy and Definitions.
We consider an economy with I agents indexed by i E I = { 1,...,I}. There is one private
good, which we will refer to as wealth. Agent i's endowment of wealth is denoted w, and the vector
of endowments w,. where we assume tw R . The agents must choose a decision d from the set
D C Rt, where we assume 0 E D. For the moment, we will not impose extra structure on D. A
state of the economy, which we will denote w, specifies each agent's utility function. The set of
possible states will be denoted D. We will write the utility function for the 2th agent in state w as
u;(d, wgi w). We assume that u is strictly increasing in d for all i and all w 1. We also assume
that u1 is continuous and strictly increasing in w; for all i and all w. We will impose some further
conditions on 12 in the subsequent sections.
For convenience, we define the cost function for the social decisions as a function c: -R..-> R.
Of course, e is only relevant on D. We assume that the cost function is strictly increasing and
concave and that c(0) = 0. Finally, we assume complete information so that all of the above
(including the state) is common knowledge among the I agents at each state.
We will refer to a social decision and an allocation of the private good arnong the agents as
an outcome. More precisely, an outcome is a point in D x R(. We will use 9 to denote a generic
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outcome and will let 8 denote the set of feasible outcomes-that is,
8 = {(d,z) E Dx R |Sz >3w- c(d)}
The core of this economy is a mapping C: £1 -+ P(®) where P(A) is the power set of A. To define
the core, we must first define what a coalition can achieve. We will write 8 s as the set of feasible
outcomes for coalition S C I. That is,
s= {(d,z) ED x R. I 3 w;- c(d)}
iES sES
In the usual terminology, we will say that the coalition S E P(I) can block the outcome 6 E e in
state w if there exists some 6' = (d', 1) E s such that
uild',x'|w) ui(d,x; w)
for all ic= S with a strict inequality for some i E S. An outcome 6 is in C(w) if there is no coalition
that can block it in state w.
A game form, G, is a pair (S, O) where S = Si x ... x Si and 0: S --> 8. A game form
together with a state define a game in normal form where the payoffs associated with the strategy
combination a E S are given by u(O(a) I w). We will say that the normal form game I'(w) =
(S, v(O w)) is induced by G in state w. Thus, for a given G, the set of equilibrium strategies must
be defined as a correspondence from 1 into S. (We will be more explicit about the definition of this
correspondence below.) For our purposes. a more useful correspondence is the set of equilibrium
outcomes. For a game form G. let E (w) be the set of equilibrium strategy tuples in S. Then the
set of equilibrium outcomes under G, EG. is defined by EG(w) = O(E (w)). We say that G fully
implements the core if EG(w) = C(w) for all w E 2. That is, a game fully implements the core if
the set of equilibrium outcomes exactly coincides with the core.
Most work in implementation theory uses the notion of Nash equilibrium to define the set
Eo(w). One important part of our analysis is that we work with refinements of Nash equilibrium.
To make as clear as possible the role that the exact choice of refinement plays, we will discuss the
outcomes under various equilibrium notions, the definitions of which are given below. To be as
precise as possible in our statements about implementation, when the correspondence EG has been
defined using (for example) perfect equilibrium and Eo(w) = C(w) for all w, we will say that G
fully implements the core in perfect equilibrium.
We work with two basic concepts: elimination of dominated strategies and perfect equilibria.
This may seem redundant since a dominated strategy cannot be played in a perfect equilibrium.
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However, a perfect equilibrium can be supported by trembles to dominated strategies so that
performing this elimination explicitly before applying perfection does affect the set of equilibria. 3
Our theorems use two different ways of combining these concepts. Theorem 1 uses what we will
call undominated perfect equilibrium or UPE for brevity. This equilibrium concept eliminates
dominated strategies and applies the notion of (trembling-hand) perfection to the resulting game.
This result, as we discuss below, also holds for many stronger equilibrium concepts, including the
one used in Theorem 2. There we use successive elimination of dominated strategies and then apply
strict perfection to the resulting game. We will refer to this as successively undominated strictly
perfect equilibrium or SUSPE.4 (Before defining these concepts precisely, we should note that the
reader already familiar with these notions can avoid the notation of what follows and proceed to
the next section.)
These definitions are notationally complex for several reasons. First, we need to define, for
an arbitrary game form, a correspondence from f2 to S giving the equilibrium strategy tuples.
However, equilibrium notions are defined on games, not game forms. Thus we must define this
correspondence with reference to the game induced by the game form and the state. Rather than
carrying around notation indicating that the game depends on the state and the game form. we will
simply define our equilibrium notions for a game and then define the equilibrium correspondence.
The second source of complexity is that we work with action sets which are uncountable. As
discussed further below, we deal with these sets through sequences of finite approximations. Thus
we have an n in our notation to denote the level of approximation. Rather than carrying around the
n in our notation, we will define the approximation technique and then only define our equilibrium
notions for finite games directly.
Third, we will consider some sequential (or multi-stage) games and thus wish to define our
equilibrium notions for the extensive form, not the normal form. Most equilibrium notions like
perfection are modified for the extensive form by simplying applying the definition to the agent-
normal form, rather than the normal form. 5 We do the same here, requiring us to define the
agent-normal form and, in principle, carry notation distinguishing the agent-normal from the
normal form. Instead, we will define the agent-normal forrn of an extensive form game and then
3 See the classic example in Myerson [19781.
4~ It may be useful to provide some relationships among these concepts and other familiar ones. The UPE's are a subset
of the perfect equilibria. In turn, the proper equilibria are a subset of the UPE's. The SUSPE's are also a subset of
the UPE's and the strictly perfect equilibria are a subset of the SUSPE's. While one may suspect that the SUSPE's are
a subset of the proper equilibria, this is not true. In fact, one can show that the proper equilibria are a subset of the
SUSPE's in the game we consider in Section III for the case where >j~ ,-= c.
5 See van Damme [1985], Chapter 6, for a detailed discussion.
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define our equilibrium notions for a finite, normal form game.
The fourth and final source of notational discomfort is that our equilibrium notions all begin
with an elimination of dominated strategies and then apply a standard equilibrium notion. Thus
there are basically two levels of definition in each equilibrium notion for finite games. To deal
with this notation efficiently, we will define a mapping which reduces a game to a simpler game by
eliminating dominated strategies. We will then, separately, define the equilibrium notions applied
to these reduced games for general finite games. At the end, we will assemble these definitions to
make the linkages as clear as possible.
So consider a normal form game r = (S, u). In all of the games we consider, S will be an
uncountable set. Since perfection and its variations are generally defined for games with finite
strategy sets, we must necessarily either consider a sequence of approximating finite games or
accept some technical complexities in defining completely mixed strategies. We adopt the former
approach.6 Thus we "discretize" the game and analyze games arbitrarily "close" to the continuous
game. To describe the approximation, note first that we can, without loss of generality, define
each Si to be a set of mappings from a set of "histories observed by i," Hi, into a set of "actions,"
A;, where there may be some constraint on the set of possible maps (because, for example, some
actions may be infeasible on certain histories). That is, we can work in terms of the extensive form
of the game, where H; is the set of information sets for i and A; is the set of actions i can take at
some information set. Clearly, for a one-shot, simultaneous move game, Hi is a singleton, so that.
for this case, we are going to more trouble than is necessary. However, we will require this level of
care for the sequential games discussed in Sections IV and V. In all of what we consider, each A,
will be an interval of the real line [a', ai.
Since we will work with the agent-normal form, "making the game finite" simply requires
making the strategy set for each agent for any player finite. That is, we only need to discretize
the A; sets, not the Si sets. Notice that making the Ai sets finite is not sufficient to imply that
the strategy sets are finite. For example, if there is an uncountable set of moves by nature which
are observable, then the strategy set would be uncountable. In all the games we will consider,
there will be no moves by nature so that this consideration need not concern us. Thus in any
approximating game, the fact that the set of actions is finite implies that the set of histories a
player can observe is, at most, countable. However, the set of maps from a countable set to a finite
set is still uncountable, so that the Si sets can still be uncountable. In fact, as we will see, the
6 For an example of the latter approach, see Chatterjee and Samuelson [1986). Their analysis is quite related to ours in
that they consider essentially a two-agent economy where the decision set is {O, 1} and a provision date.
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approximating strategy sets will be uncountable in the game we consider in Section V.
Let A;(n) denote a finite subset of Ai, which we will denote { ai,... , an}. We require that Ai(n)
have the property that for all k E {1,... , m} and all i,
(1) a1 - a =(k-1) ai - a2  (k- 1)8,
Also,
(2) 1 - a 1 6
(3) Ian - I ~ '5
Notice that 6,, is the same for all i. Thus we require that the elements of the approximating set
A=(n) are equally spaced from each other for all i and must be close to the extreme points of A,.
Let H,(n) be the set of histories in Hi for which every player has chosen an action in A,(n). Finally.
let Si(n) denote the set of maps in Si which only map from points in H=(n) into points in A;(n).
Then. letting S(n) = S1(n) x ... x Sj(n), let r(n) be the game (S(n), u).
For each equilibrium notion we use, we will say a is an equilibrium of r if it is the limit of a
sequence {u(n) } of equilibrium points of a sequence of approximating games {T(n)}. More precisely.
let p be an equilibrium correspondence defined on the set of games with finite strategy sets. We will
extend the correspondence o to a game with an uncountable strategy set in the following way. Let
N denote some subsequence of the positive integers. We will say that a E S is an element of o(F)
iff there exists a sequence {O(n)}eN converging to a such that for each n E N. u(n) E 0(r (n)).'
Now we are ready to begin defining equilibrium notions. We first define the agent-normal form
and then define equilibrium notions to be applied to this form. So consider a game (S, u) where,
for each i. Si is the set of maps from :'s possible information sets, H,, into a finite set of possible
actions for i, Ai. The agent-normal form of this game is constructed by replacing the players with
"agents" who represent the players, where each player has a different agent working for him at each
information set. In other words, we alter the set of players from {1,..., I} to the set
{ih j ie EI, AE Hg}
The strategy set of agent ih is simply those actions that i might choose at information set h. That
is,
Sih = { a E Ai a = oidh) for somne o'i & ;
Notice that we are allowing any subsequence of the positive integers and any approxirnation satisfying (1) thbrough (3)
for each n.
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Notice that the fact that Ai is finite immediately implies that each agent has a finite strategy set.
Given a vector of strategies for all the agents, we can immediately define the implied strategies for
the players by
cr;(h) = aih
where ash is the action chosen by ih. Then the payoff to agent ih is u()-that is, ih receives the
same payoff as i.
The agent-normal form has several advantages over the normal form when considering a se-
quential game. Basically, it eliminates correlation in "trembles" across different stages in the game.
Since we take the agents to be separate players, if i makes a "mistake" at one stage, there is no
reason to believe that he will do so again at a later stage. It is also worth noting that eliminat-
ing dominated strategies in the agent-normal form is more difficult than eliminating them in the
normal form. Thus performing this removal as we do eliminates fewer possible equilibria than if
we worked with the normal form. The reason this is true is quite simple. In the agent-normal
form, one considers a strategy for an agent ih to be dominated based on a consideration of what
all other agents might do- including i at a different information set. By contrast, when working
with the normal form, one can eliminate action combinations over information sets. For example.
suppose that i has two successive information sets. Consider a strategy which specifies an action
at each information set with the property that his action at the first information set is disastrous
given his action at the second information set. This strategy could well be dominated in the normal
form. However, in considering the agent-normal form, we do not consider 1's choice at the second
information set as fixed. Thus we may not be able to eliminate this strategy.
We will now define the equilibrium notions for a game F = (S, u). We assume that F is in
agent-normal form so that we can take Si to be a finite set for each i. (We refer to agents here as
i instead of ih for simplicity.) We will say that a strategy for i, a; E S, is dominated if there exists
01E Si such that for allua,;E S,;S,
with a strict inequality for some ~ E S, . Let R'(S) denote the set of strategies for i which are
not dominated and let R'(S) = R'(S1 ) x ... x R1(S1). Then let R'(F) denote the game (R1(S), u).
An undominated perfect equilibrium of F is a perfect equilibrium of R1 (F). Similaily, when we
refer to an equilibrium notion such as undominated proper equilibrium or undominated strictly
perfect equilibrium, we will mean the proper or strictly perfect equilibria of R' 1). For n 2 2,
recursively define R4(S,) as the set of strategies for i which are not dominated in R~ 1 (F) where
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R"(J) is defined analogously to R1(P). In other words, R"(Si) = R1(R" 1(S)). Finally, define
R (Si) as the set of strategies in R"(S;) for all n and R*'(F) analogously to the above. (Notice
that R" (Si) must be nonempty for all i.) A successively undominated perfect equilibrium of r is a
perfect equilibrium of R* (F) and similarly for a successively undominated proper equilibrium or a
successively undominated strictly perfect equilibrium.
We are now ready to define the perfect and strictly perfect equilibria of an arbitrary game with
a finite strategy set. So, again, consider an arbitrary game r = (S, u) where each Si is finite. Let
A be the set of probability mass functions over Si such that each element of Si is given strictly
positive probability. That is A; is the set of totally mixed strategies for each player. A typical
element of A' will be written si where s (o) is the probability that i chooses the strategy oa. Let
A and a denote the usual cartesian products. A typical element of A, will be written s~, and
a typical element of A° will be written s. Finally, let Vi(ai, s,,,;) be the expected payoff to i when he
chooses pure strategy of and the other players choose mixed strategies sj. where expected utilities
are defined in lhe usual way. Let N denote some sequence of the positive integers. Then a is a
perfect equilibrium for 1 if there exists a sequence {s}nEN such that
(4) s"E A*, Vn E N.
(5) lifm s; (a )->1ViE ,
and
(6) V(g, s"n) V ' s Vi E I, Vn E N, and VaE S.
In other words, for each i. o, is a best reply to some vector of completely mixed strategies for
the other players close to c~,.
Strict perfection requires much more-essentially that og is a best response to every vector of
completely mixed strategies for the other players close to ,,i. It is important to note that not
every normal form game possesses a strictly perfect equilibrium. In fact, the games we consider,
while they do possess undominated strictly perfect equilibria or successively undominated strictly
perfect equilibria, do not in fact possess strictly perfect equilibria.
More precisely, a is a strictly perfect equilibrium of 1' iff for any sequence {s"}nEN in A0 for
all n E N such that a is the limit as n -+ oc of {s"l}, we have
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for all i, all o' E Si, and all n E N. Thus perfection requires robustness with respect to some
small probabilities of mistakes by the other players, while strict perfection requires robustness with
respect to all small probabilities of mistakes by the other players.
We are finally ready to assemble definitions. Let r be any agent-normal form game with a finite
strategy set or, equivalently, the agent-normal form of an extensive form game where the action
set for each player is finite. We will say that a is an undominated perfect equilibrium (UPE) of r
if it is a perfect equilibrium of R1(1). Similarly, a is a successively undominated strictly perfect
equilibrium (SUSPE) of F if it is a strictly perfect equilibrium of R*(I'). If F has an uncountable
strategy set, we say that a is a UPE (SUSPE) of r if there is a sequence {a(n)}nEN converging to
a such that a(n) is a UPE (SUSPE) of T(n) for all n E N.
Finally, we will say that a game form G = (S, 0) fully implements the core in UPE (SUSPE)
if EG(w) = C(w) for all w E D where EG(w) is the set of a E S such that a is a UPE (SUSPE) of
the game induced by G at state w.
III. The One-Streetlight Problem.
In this section, we simplify the above structure to the case where D = {0,1 }. For simplicity, we
let c = c(1). Without loss of generality, we adopt the normalization us(0, wI w) = 0 for each i and
each w E 11. The valuation of agent i in state w, vj(w), is defined implicitly by ui(1, wi - wvw) = 0.
Since the valuations define everything about u; that is relevant for our purposes at a state w, we
will often omit the w argument and focus on the valuations directly. We also assume that for each
state, w, > v(w) for all i-that is, u;(1, 0 w) < 0 for all w E Q. This assumption is made so that
we do not need to consider what happens when some agents would like to contribute more than
their wealth. In short, we take the set c to be {w 0 < v(w) < w}. To guarantee that the problem
is interesting, we also assume that E; w, > c. We will refer to this class of economies as &1.
Characterizing the core of an economy in tl is quite straightforward. If Z8 v,(w) < c, then the
only point in the core is (0, w). This is true because any other distribution of wealth along with
d = 0 clearly cannot be both feasible and in the core. Similarly, any distribution of wealth with
d = 1 leaves some agent worse off than if he refused to participate and hence cannot be in the core.
If >jj v,(w) = c, the core consists of the points (0, w) and (1, w - v). Again, it is clear that any
other distribution of wealth could be blocked by some coalition. Finally, if )2 v,(w) > c, then any
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outcome in the core must have d = 1 as this condition is necessary for Pareto optimality. Clearly,
the wealth distribution at a core outcome must have each individual with at least wi- vi or else some
individual agent would block. If any agent receives more than w=, then the coalition of all agents
other than this one can block as their loss of wealth is in part received by this individual. Thus the
core is certainly no larger than the set of (1, x) such that E ; = E> w1 - c and wi - vi < z wi
for all i. In fact, it is easy to see that no coalition can block an outcome in this set and so this set
is precisely the core.8
A very natural way to consider the problem of how the agents get together to jointly provide
the good is to suppose that they contribute money toward the building of the streetlight. If the
contributions add to c or more, the streetlight is provided. A variety of assumptions could be made
concerning what happens when not enough money is contributed, not all of which would lead to
efficient outcomes. For example, we might assume that contributions are not refunded regardless
of the total. 9 However, with such a structure the possibility of insufficient contributions may deter
agents from contributing. An obvious way to avoid this problem is to assume that if contributions
add to less than c, all contributions are refunded. This contribution game is a simple generalization
of one used by Palfrey and Rosenthal [1984'i to model private provision and similar games have been
used in experimental work 10 for the same purpose.11
More formally, let the strategy set of agent i be S1 = 10, wtj. A strategy choice by i will be
denoted of and will be referred to as a contribution. Define 01() by
O -f (Ow), if Eog <z C;
- (1, w - a), otherwise.
We will refer to this particular game form as G1.
As we will discuss in more detail below, there are many Nash equilibria of this game, some of
which are not in the core. However, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. G1 fully implements the core of &E1 in undominated perfect equilibrium.
To understand this result, first, consider the case where >j; v2(w) < c. As noted, the only
8 See Mas-Colell [1980) for a more detailed characterization of the core in a setting which has l 1 as a special case.
9 Paifrey and Rosenthal 119841 considered this possibility.
10 See, for example, Ferejohn, Forsythe, Noll and Palfrey 119821, Schneider and Pommerehne [19811 or Isaac, Wailker and
Thomas 119841.
11 It is also worth noting that this game is essentially a simplification of Nash's 119531 demand game. While our results
had been known and in fact are straightforward to prove for the case of 1 = 2, the generalization is new. We know of
no proof for the general Nash demand game. Our results do generalize t~o the original Nash demand game under certain
simplifications.
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core outcome at such a state is (0, w) and it is easy to see that all Nash equilibria must have this
outcome. Simply note that no one will contribute more than v= if this will cause the streetlight to
be built. Hence contributions cannot possibly add to c in equilibrium.
Now suppose E v, > c and consider the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game. It
is easy to see that any vector of contributions a such that 0 < a, v; for all i and >Lci = c must
be a Nash equilibrium. Since a, < v=, each agent's equilibrium utility is at least 0 so that no agent
can increase his payoff by contributing less. Such a deviation will cause the decision to change and
he will get utility of 0. Similarly, an increase in agent i's contribution can only make him worse
off because the streetlight will be provided at the lower contribution. Thus we see that there is a
Nash equilibrium outcome for each point in the core.
However, there are other Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In particular, consider any a such
that o ;> 0 for all i, E .,,< c. andY Eraj+v; K c for all i. In this equilibrium, the streetlight is not
built, so each agent's utility is 0. This is an equilibrium because for each agent, any contribution
that changes the decision exceeds vi. Given that no contribution below v, will cause the streetlight
to be built, agent i is indifferent among all contributions which do not lead to the streetlight being
built. These equilibrium outcomes are not in the core.
All of the equilibria which lead to core outcomes are strong Nash equilibria (see van Damme
1983) and thus satisfy virtually all robustness requirements ever proposed in game theory. How-
ever, the other equilibria are not so robust. Many of them are not perfect. for example. In a perfect
equilibrium, each agent's strategy must be robust to small probabilities of "mistakes." It is easy to
see that no Nash equilibrium in which ag> vi can be perfect. If the streetlight will not be provided,
then contributing more than vi is costless since this contribution will be refunded. Hence this can
occur in a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if there is even a tiny probability that some other
agent(s) will "accidentally" contribute enough so that the streetlight is built, then i strictly prefers
contributing less than vi.
There are equilibria which do not have outcomes in the core and which are perfect. To see
this, suppose that c = 1, I = 3, and each person's valuation is .5. Then a, = 0 for all i is a perfect
equilibrium. In particular, suppose each person puts probability 1- E on 0, kE/(1 +k) on .5, and the
rest of the probability on the, remaining strategies. Choose k to be very large. Then it is virtually
certain that the sum of the other two players' contributions is either 0, .5, or 1. In any of these
cases, z's best strategy is ug = 0 and in the last case, this is his unique best strategy. Hence any
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other strategy must yield a strictly lower expected payoff. Intuitively, certain trembles will not
induce an agent to increase his contribution because either he will end up contributing when the
good would be provided without his contribution or he would have to contribute vto have any
effect.
Intuitively, these trembles do not seem plausible. The equilibrium in the example required that
the agents were most likely to tremble to contributing their entire valuations. Clearly, though, any
smaller contribution weakly dominates this one. Hence if we eliminate such dominated strategies
even as trembles. then this possibility is eliminated. This is why we focus on undominated perfect
equilibria.
The result holds under a large variety of other equilibrium notions. The robustness of the
equilibria with outcomes in the core when E, v, > c means that we can use any stronger equilibrium
notion given that we first eliminate dominated strategies. Thus, for example, Theorem 1 is trivially
extended to undominated proper equilibria or undominated strictly perfect equilibria.
The elimination of dominated strategies before applying one of these two equilibrium notions
is not necessary for eliminating the equilibria not in the core when F' v,> c. As we have shown
elsewhere,1 2 simply focusing on proper equilibrium without first removing dominated strategies
has this effect and hence the same must be true for strict perfection.13 The problem with these
concepts is that they remove too many equilibria in the cases where ' ;V K c. In particular, one
can show that the only proper equilibrium outcome when 7, v= c is (1, w -v) so that the set of
equilibrium outcomes does not exactly coincide with the core at such a state. However, one can
show that this is the only circumstance in which this is true so that G1 implements the core of
E 1 generically in proper equilibria. One can also show that when E ;v c, there are no strictly
perfect equilibria (in pure strategies). Removing dominated strategies first guarantees that enough
of the Nash equilibria for the cases where ', v ; c remain when properness or strict perfection is
used.
It is also worth noting that the set of successively undominated perfect equilibrium (SUPE)
outcomes is identical to the set of UPE outcomes. To see this, note that the strategies removed in
the first round of elimination are those where some agent contributes more than Vj or contributions
so small that c - o-i > Zg, tvg. Any other contribution can be a best reply to some o , and
12 See Bagnoli and Lipman 119861.
13 The fact that properness eliminates the equilibria with outcomes outside the core is intuitively clear from the fact that
these equilibria can only be perfect if the trembles are to dominated strategies The problem of trembles to dominated
strategies was precisely the motivation for Myerson's 119781 introduction of the properness concept
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hence cannot be eliminated. Thus if > v= < c, this round of elimination already implies that
any equilibrium outcome is in the core and no further elimination will change this. Suppose that
v; > c. Since the equilibria with outcomes in the core all have strict best replies chosen by
each player, none of these strategies can be dominated so that no further elimination of dominated
strategies will eliminate these equilibria. Since there are no other equilibria, the set of SUPE
outcomes would be the same as the set of UPE outcomes. In short, Theorem 1 holds for SUPE
and SUSPE as well as UPE.
IV. The Multiple Streetlights Problem.
In this section. we consider a broader social decision set. Here we take D to be {0,... , M} for
some finite 11 > 1-for example, how many streetlights to build. Since we will find it necessary
to work with sequential mechanisms, eliminating wealth effects is quite useful. Therefore, we will
simplify our assumptions on preferences and assume that u1(d, wi w) = U=(d w) + w for all i and
all w E . Analogously to the previous section, define the valuation of agent i for the doh streetlight
as t (d ;) = U(d i w) - U(d - I w). As before, this will summarize most of what we need and
so we will often omit the w argument.
Recall that we have assumed that ui(d, w, I w) is strictly increasing in d, which implies that
v,(d w) > 0 for all d > 1 and all i. We will also assume that utility is strictly concave in d-more
precisely, we assume that vi(d . w) is strictly decreasing in d. Finally, as in the last section, it is
convenient to eliminate the possibility that some agent wishes to contribute more than his wealth.
Hence we will assume that wi is greater than Z's total valuation. That is, w'1 > U(M I w) for all i.
In other words,
Q = {w |0< v,(d ' w) < v(d - 1 |w) for all id and E v,(d I w) < wi for all i}
dED
Analogously to the previous section, we assume Zi wi > c(M) and for simplicity we also assume
Ew , < c(M + 1). We will refer to this set of economies as g2.
The core of an economy in g2 is not quite as easy to characterize as the core of £1. It is
straightforward to define the Pareto optimal decision as the largest d E D such that
Zv(dlw) c(d)- c(d -1)
13
Denote this value of d by d"(w). (If there is no d E D for which this holds, then d"(w) = 0.)14
Clearly, any outcome in the core must have d = d*(w). The distribution of wealth is more complex.
To characterize this, we make use of results in Mas-Colell [1980]. We will say that a price system
is a vector of functions (p',... , p) with pi : D x 02 -+ R+. An outcome (d', z') is supported by a
price system at w if
(7) p,(d' |w) = c(d')
(8) (d', x) maximizes u;(d, xi w) on {(d, zx) I pi(d w) + x = w}
(9) d' maximizes p(d w) - c(d) on D
Mas-Colell proves the following characterization of the core which we will make use of in our proofs.
Proposition. The outcome (d, z) is a supported by a price system at w if (d,z) E C(w).
There are many ways one could generalize the game of the previous section to the situation
considered here. The most obvious generalization would be to suppose that agents contribute any
amount they choose and the largest value of d such that the contributions cover c(d) is chosen,
with some rule to cover the possibility that contributions are less than c(1). Such a game will not
implement the core under any refinement of the Nash equilibria. To see this, choose w such that
d- (w) = 2. , v(2 w) < c(2), and v(2 j w) < c(2) - c(1) for all i. (For a concrete example, suppose
1 = 3, v;(1) = 1 for all i, v1(2) = 1/2 for all i, c(1) = 1. c(2) = 2.3, and Al = 2.) Consider any
set of contributions summing to c(2) such that each individual contributes less than v(1) +± v(2).
This outcome is in the core and these strategies are the only way to achieve this outcome with this
game. However, these strategies cannot constitute a Nash equilibrium. Note that the fact that
E v(2) < c(2) implies that there must exist some agent i whose contribution strictly exceeds vj(2).
Consider the deviation from the proposed equilibrium whereby this agent reduces his contribution
by v(2)+ e for some small e > 0. By assumption, vi(2) is less than c(2) - c(1). so that the outcome
with this reduced contribution will have d = 1 if E is sufficiently small. But then he loses one
streetlight worth v(2) to him, but reduces his payments by mrore than this. Hence by deviating.
he increases his expected payoff so that the strategies cannot be an equilibrium.
Thus if we wish to retain the contribution game structure, we must necessarily consider a
sequential game of some kind. The one we choose is certainly not the only natural extension of G1,
14 If Zv(d (w)) = c(d) - c(d - 1). then outcomes with d = d' (w) - 1 are also in the core. The proofs do take accounit tof
this fact, though, for simplicity, the discussion in the text does not.
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but. appears to be quite a reasonable one. We suppose that agents contribute any non-negative
amount of wealth they choose. If the amount contributed falls short of c(1), then, as before, the
contributions are refunded and no streetlight is built. If the contributions are exactly equal to c(k)
for some k> 1, then we continue with another round of contributions where k becomes the "status
quo" instead of 0. Intuitively, this structure reproduces the one-streetlight game in successive
rounds and thus would seem likely to implement the core. The more difficult part of the game to
specify is what happens if contributions fall strictly between c(k) and c(k + 1) for some k between
1 and M - 1. Such a situation is "falling short" of the necessary contributions in one sense and
"having enough" in another. Hence it is not obvious what the appropriate incentives should be at
this point. We assume that in such a situation, the difference between the amount contributed and
c(k) is refunded to the agents in proportion to their contributions. Then we proceed as if exactly
c(k) had been contributed.
Defining the game form more precisely is rather notation-intensive. First, we define histories
and a function O from histories into outcomes. Then we can define the strategy sets, S2. Since a
strategy in our game is a mapping from histories into feasible actions and since actions determine
what is feasible at the next round. this order of exposition is necessary. Finally, we define a
function from strategies into histories, giving the play of the game for a set of strategies. The
outcome function 02, then, is simply the composition of O~ with this map.
In the game we consider, all past contributions by all agents are common knowledge, so that
a history of length m is an ml vector. We define the set of histories analogously to Kalai and
Stanford [1986). The set of histories of length 0, H°, consists of the single element { e} which is the
"empty history." The set of histories of length m is H'= R". The set of all histories, then, is
H= UHm
m=0
Notice that we need not consider histories longer than M as our game must end after M - 1 rounds.
However, it will prove convenient later to allow for arbitrarily long histories. We let h denote a
generic element of H and use £(h) denote the length of the history h. Not all histories in H are
physically possible, not even all of those with length less than M, because of the fact that agents
cannot contribute more than their wealth. Once we have a few more definitions, we will identify
the set of feasible histories.
To define the mapping from histories into outcomes, we need a bit more notation. Define the
projection operators Pm: H -+ H' for m = 1,..., as giving for any It, the mth 1 vector in It. If
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m > e(h), we take Pm(h) to be e. That is, Pm(h) tells what the contributions were at the rnth
round along the history h. We can use the projection operators to define the concatenation of two
histories h and h' as follows. The concatenation, which we will denote h -h', is defined as that
history h" of length E(h) + e(h') such that
nh { Pm(h), for m < (h);Pm(A) = P-e(h)(h'), otherwise.
Notice that our definition implies e - h = h- e = h for any history h.
We recursively define the outcomes at a round as follows. Suppose h is a history of length
e> 1. Then
ol(h) = (k'(h),r'(h),t(h))
where k1 (h) is the largest integer k such that
tP1(h) c(k)
where t is an I vector of all ones. The function r'(h) is given by
,.1 (h) = 1, if k1(h) >1;
0, otherwise.
and t 1(h) gives actual contributions at round 1. Recall that some contributions may be refunded.
The actual contribution by the 2th agent is the amount he offered minus his refund. His refund is
tP 1 (h) - c(k'(h)) times the proportion his contribution was of the total. Hence




(If P1(h) = 0, then t'(h) = 0.) Then for m L, we can calculate om(h) = (km(Iz), rm(h), t m(h)) by
o"(h) = om-1(h) if r.-1(h) = 0 and otherwise is given as follows. Analogously to the above, km(h)
is the largest integer k such that
iPmn(h) c(k) - c(k"~(h))
r-"(h) = f 1, if km(A) km-(h) +1;{. 0, otherwise.
t m~h) = c(km (h)) - c(km-'(h))~ A
(Again, if Pm(h) = 0, we have tm (h) = tm-1(h).)
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Define m' (h) as the smallest value of m < £(h) such that rm(h) = 0 if such an m exists. If no
such m. exists, the game has not ended yet. In this case, we leave m" (h) undefined. For h such that
n' (h) is defined, we can define a mapping from histories into outcomes by
0' (A) = (km(h), w - tm*(h)(h))
We can use the om maps. to identify the set of feasible histories, H". For convenience, we will
let H- be the set of histories in H such that tm (h) w for all m and such that Pm(h) = e for
all m such that r"1(h) = 0. In other words, agents need not consider histories which are either
infeasible or for which contributions are no longer being solicited.15 We are finally ready to define
S2 . A strategy for agent i is a mapping, a1, from H' into R± which is feasible. Feasibility requires
that
oi(h) - t (h) sw
for all h E H'. Let Si be the set of such maps and, of course, let S2 = x ... X S.
It is easy to define the history induced by a vector of strategies in S2. For any a E S2.
recursively define the functions 6' for m = 0,..., by
?t (h) = h
and for m> 1.
4(h) = 4Q~1(h) -o(<i" (h))
where. for any h H', u(h) = e. In other words, 6S(h) is an identity function. Then ©R(h) gives
the history h followed by the actions of the agents on the history h. Similarly, 62 is the history
h -eo(h) followed by the actions of the agents on this history and so on. Thus #'(e) gives the first
m actions of the agents given that they follow the strategies o. Let k'(a) = 4¢'(e). This gives the
entire history induced by a. Notice that h-(a) will necessarily have length less than or equal to
M +1. The outcome function, 02, then, is defined by 0 2(a) = 0' (h' (u)). Let G2 denote the game
form (S2, 02).
Unfortunately, this game will not fully implement the core in UPE. First, eliminating dominated
strategies once is not sufficient. To see the point, suppose that d'(w) = 2 and M = 4. If we
reach a point in the game at which two streetlights have been paid for and contributions are still
being collected, contributing more than ;(3) would seem not to be a particularly good strategy
15 The usefulness of this definition is that it guarantees that HW is finite in our sequence of approximating games.
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for the following reasons. First, notice that no one will contribute more than v,(4) at the last
round so that even if c(3) - c(2) is raised at this round, we will never get a fourth streetlight as
contributions at the next round could not possibly sum to c(4) - c(3). Furthermore, no one will
contribute more than v(3)+ v=(4) at this round so that contributions at this round cannot possibly
sum to c(4) - c(2). Thus contributing more than v(3) is accepting a loss which cannot be made
up. However, a strategy specifying such a contribution is not dominated. The reason is that the
argument suggesting that this strategy is a rather poor one relies on the argument that no one
else will use a dominated strategy. Thus this strategy is not dominated, though if we eliminate
dominated strategies, this strategy will be dominated in the resulting game. For this reason, we
successively eliminate dominated strategies as our first step. Recall that successive removal of
dominated strategies before applying perfection would not alter the set of equilibrium outcomes in
GI.
Even once we have done this, applying perfection to the resulting game is not sufficient. To see
this, suppose we have I= 10. For agent 1, we have vi(1) = 1, vi(2) = .9, and v1(3) = .89. For all
other agents, v(1) = 4.7/9, vj(2) = 4.6/9, and vo(3) = .01. Suppose M = 3, c(1) = 2.1, c(2) = 4.3.
and c(3) = 6.6. Then the strategy for agent 1 of contributing 2.1 in the first round cannot be
eliminated by successive removal of dominated strategies. To see this, consider the strategies for
the agents other than 1 of contributing nothing in the first round and .5 in the second round. The
best reply for agent 1 is to contribute 2.1 in the first round. If he gives any less, his utility will be
zero. However, if he gives 2.1, the other agents will contribute a total of 4.5 in the second round.
bringing us up to three streetlights. The game will necessarily end there and agent 1's payoff will
be 2.79 - 2.1 = .69. Thus he should contribute 2.1. These strategies, of course, do not constitute
a Nash equilibrium. However, none of them can be eliminated by successive removal of dominated
strategies. If we try to apply perfection to the game after successive removal, then, this strategy
for player 1 will still be possible. Hence we could consider having player 1 tremble to it with high
probability to support a strategy by the other players of contributing 0 in the first round. It is easy
to see that a slightly more complex example with two "large" agents each of whom have a high
probability of trembling to c(1) in the first round can support a perfect equilibrium where no one
contributes anything in the first round. Thus we must consider a stronger equilibrium concept.
For these reasons, we are led to focus on successively undominated strictly perfect equilibria
or SUSPE. Recall that Theorem 1 holds under this equilibrium notion as well as UPE.




To see the intuition behind the result, fix some w and ask how an equilibrium with an outcome
outside C(w) could come about. First, it is clear that the equilibrium outcome must have d <; d (w).
Overprovision cannot be a Nash equilibrium, much less SUSPE.
Since any agent can unilaterally deviate to a smaller contribution and lower both his payment
and the social decision, if equilibrium outcome has d = d (w), then no coalition of one could block
it. It is not obvious that this implies that the outcome/is in the core. However, suppose some
coalition of two could block the equilibrium outcome so that it is not in the core. The coalition
of two would choose some social decision smaller than d (w) and pay for it themselves. Yet in
equilibrium, either of them could reduce his contribution and cause the social decision to fall to
no less than d(w). The fact that they do not do so indicates that, in fact, the coalition could not
block. Hence we see that if an equilibrium outcome is not in the core, it must be true that the
social decision is strictly less than the efficient one.
So suppose that this is the case. Then there is some round at which contributions do not add
up to enough to build an additional streetlight even though the valuations for that streetlight do
sum to more than the cost. Strict perfection requires that strategies be robust with respect to all
small probabilities of mistakes by other players. So to obtain a contradiction, we can choose any
trembles we wish. It is not surprising that this freedom coupled with the fact that we can find
Pareto dominating strategies means that we can always induce someone to change their strategy
in such a situation. Thus no equilibrium with an outcorm outside the core can exist.
Showing that each outcome in the core is achieved by some equilibrium is quite tedious, but
intuitively clear. Notice that we can simply have a succession of rounds with one additional street-
light purchased at each round with the contributions adding to exactly marginal cost at each round.
Then each player is choosing a strict best response and no sufficiently small probability of error by
another player will induce a deviation.
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V. Approximating the Continuum: Limit Properties.
One of the most intriguing aspects of this game is that it can be used to approximately
fully implement the core for the case where D is uncountable in the following sense. Let Dr =
{0, b,26,... , M(6)}, where M(6) is the largest integer multiple of S less than or equal to M. It is
simply an alteration of our notation to show that the game defined in Section IV fully implements
the core with this decision set for any 6 > 0. Intuitively, then, as S y 0, the set of equilibrium
outcomes is converging to the core of the economy where the decision set is Do = [0, Mj.
In this section, we will formalize this intuition and also demonstrate some surprising properties
of our game at the limit where 6 = 0. As we will show, the set of equilibrium outcomes does
not intersect the core and is identical to the set of equilibrium outcomes in the game analyzed by
Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (henceforth BBV). As we argue, our game at the limit is essentially
a repeated version of their game and so this equivalence is not entirely surprising.
To begin, define of(h) = (kf(h), rf(h), tf (h)) analogously to the above definition for om(h).
That is, kf(h) is defined to be the largest integer multiple of 6 such that
tPm(h) ? c(k) - c(k'1(h))
if rf(I(h) = 1 and m < £(h). Similarly.
_ ah 1, if kf"(h) > kf~1(h)+6;
0, otherwise.
for h such that r7"'1(h) = 1 and m < £(h). We can define mrn(h) precisely as above and use this to
define O; as above. We can use this to define the set of feasible histories. Hj, analogously to the
above and the strategy set Si. Finally, the functions generating the sequence of actions for a given
set of strategies are identical to those defined above and the outcome function, OF is, again. the
composition of 0; with this function. Let G, = (Se, OF).
We can also define the analogous mappings for the game "at the limit." We will denote these
by o"'(h) = (ke"'(h), ro'(h), to(h)). These are defined recursively by defining k(h) to be that value
of k solving
tP 1(h) = c(k)
Then
th(h) = t P1(h)
20
and
(h) 1, if k(h) > 0;
0, otherwise.
Then for m > 1 and h such that £(h) > m, if r'~(h) = 0, ooW(h) = o'"~1(h). Otherwise, k1"(h) is
that value of k solving
tPm(h) = c(k) - c(ko' 1(h))
to(h) = t'" 1(h) + tPm(h)
and
ro'(h) - ' if km(h) > k " 1 (h);
(0, otherwise.
We can define mo"(h), O(h), H6, and So exactly analogously to what we did before. Again, the
outcome function Oo is the composition of O with h'. Let Go.= (So, O).
To formalize the notion that the game form Go is the limit of the sequence of game forms
{GG },sa for some sequence 6 E A requires some additional terminology. Since G6 is a pair, we
must require convergence of both S to So and Os to Oo. The latter is obviously most simply
defined in terms of pointwise convergence. However, the fact that Og and Oo are functions from
different spaces makes this more complex. Hence we will say that the sequence {O } A converges




Sr = { :1H -RI I(h)+--te(h) <u', Vh E H}
Hence a natural way to define the convergence of the sets Se to So is to require the domains to
converge and to require a certain convergence of feasibility. We do this by the following definition.
We will say that the sequence {SE }6e converges to So if each of the following holds:
(10) Vh E H6, there exists 6 > 0 such that V6 E A with 6 < 6 , h E H
Va E So, there exists 6 > 0 such that VS E A with 6 <83
(12)|OHofnH E{ |a =a'|HonlHi, for some u' ES6)}
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In (12), the notation a | A for any set A denotes the restriction of a to A. As we will show in the
proof of the lemma, H; c H for all S sufficiently small. Hence we can rewrite (12) as
Va E So, there exists b > 0 such that VS E A with b < 6, a j H: E S6
Now we are ready to state our lemma asserting convergence of G6 to Go.
Lemma. Gs - Go as5S jO0.
BBV consider a game in which each agent can contribute any non-negative amount of the
private good he chooses. Letting these contributions be denoted g,, the amount of the public
good provided is taken to be Y2 gi. A simple alteration of their game would be to allow agents to
contribute in successive rounds. If the amount of contributions is strictly positive at the first round,
further contributions are solicited. Once the amount contributed at a round is zero, collections cease
and the public good is provided in an amount whose cost equals the total amount of money collected
over the course of the game.
Yet this is precisely Go. When b = 0, it is impossible for contributions to fall strictly between
c(k) and c(k + 6). The determination of when another round of contributions are solicited would
be precisely that the level of the public good increased-that is, that nonzero contributions were
offered.
Thus in this sense, our game has a repeated version of the BBV' game as its limit. As noted
above, it is not difficult to prove an analogue of Theorem 2. To state this analogue, let 4c denote
the set of economies described above with social decision set De. (To maintain our assumptions on
endowments, we will assume that 7, wi > c(M) throughout.) Let C(w) be the core of the economy
at state w. Then it is straightforward to see that the game form G6 fully implements the core of
£6 in SUSPE for all b > 0. Let Co denote the set of economies with decision set Do and let Cos)
denote the core of 'o at state w. Since it is straightforward to show that C (w) converges to Go(w)
asS ,1 we see that for all w, the set of SUSPE outcomes of G6 converges to Co(w) as S; 0.
Putting it differently,
Theorem 3. The sequence of game forms G6 approximately fully implements the core of 4o in
successively undominated strictly perfect equilibrium.
As mentioned, the set of equilibria at the limit is rather different. In general, as we will show
SThis convergence is defined identically to the convergence of the sets H~ to 11.
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below, there are no SUSPE's. As we will see, this is, in part, due to the approximation technique.
We characterize the set of Nash equilibria that are limit points of Nash equilibria of approximating
games and show that the set of outcomes so defined does not intersect the core. We conclude by
offering some intuition for these results.
It is useful to first describe the set of Nash equilibria in the one-shot version of the BBV game.
To do so, let di(w) solve
maxUg(d|w)- c(d)
d
and let d(w) = maxie d;(w). Let 11(w) be the set of i such that d=(w) = 2(w) and let 12(w) denote
I h1(w). Then we can define
81(w) =(d. z) E ®!| d = d(w), zi = wi - c( d),
iEi 1 (w) iEli(w)
xi E [0, wi Vi, and z = w,Vj E I 2 (w) }
In other words. e1 (w) is the set of outcomes where d is equal to the largest number anyone would
buy for themselves if they could afford it. Those who want this maximum amount pay for it in
any way that does not require any agent to pay more than his wealth. The remaining agents pay
nothing. 17
In any Nash equilibrium in which the game ends after a finite number of rounds, the outcome
must have d = f(w). To see this, note that if the game is going to end with a smaller amount of
the public good, any individual desiring d(w) would contribute whatever was necessary to achieve
this amount. If the game would end with a larger amount, then, in the last round of contributions,
there must be some individual who would prefer to reduce his contribution. It is not difficult to
use this to show that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the one-shot BBV game is 81(w).
The above reasoning does not apply to equilibria where contributions are given forever. Notice,
though, that in any approximating game, there is some minimum strictly positive contribution.
Hence in any approximating game, there must be only a finite number of rounds of contributions.
Therefore, any equilibrium outcome of an approximating game must have d = 2(w), implying that
the equilibrium outcomes of Go must as well. It is not true in general, though, that the only
outcomes that can be achieved by Nash equilibria with a finite nurnber of rounds are outcomes in
e1 (w). A counterexample is given in the Appendix along with the proof of Theorem 4. We will refer
17 The discussion in the text ignores~ the possibility that wealth constraints are binding. It is straightforward to show that
w >Ug(M j w) for all w implies that wealth constraints will not bind.
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to a Nash equilibrium which is the limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of approximating
games as an approachable equilibrium.
Theorem 4. For each w, every approachable equilibrium outcome of Go has d = d(w). Furthermore,
©1(w) is a subset of the set of the approachable equilibrium outcomes at w.
It is not difficult to show that the set of approachable outcomes of Go does not intersect Co(w).
To see this intuitively, suppose that c(d) = d and that the utility functions are differentiable. Then
di(w) is where agent z's marginal utility is 1. Hence the social decision in an approachable outcome
of Go is necessarily where some agent's marginal utility is 1 (and the others' marginal utilities are
all strictly positive) while the efficient d is where the sum of the agent's marginal utilities is 1. This
fact, then, indicates a strong difference between the limiting game and the game at the limit.
This result would suggest that the SUSPE outcomes are disjoint from the core. However, this is
not true because the set of SUSPE's is generally empty. To see this, note that in an approximating
game. there must be a finite number of rounds in any Nash equilibrium and the outcome must have
d = d(w). Consider the last stage at which contributions are received in such an equilibrium and
suppose some person deviates downward in his contribution. As long as positive contributions are
received, the game continues. Obviously, for the original strategies to constitute an equilibrium, it
must be true that no one makes up the shortfall in contributions for the deviator, as otherwise he
would certainly desire to deviate in this fashion. Hence either the shortfall is not made up or the
deviator himself makes it up. It is not hard to see that subgame perfection (which is, of course.
implied by SUSPE) requires the latter because any contributor in the last round must be some i
such that i,(w) = i(w).
It is also not hard to see that the successive elimination of dominated strategies does not
pin down very precisely the strategies that may be employed by the deviator at the subsequent
history. Thus the deviator may make up the shortfall all in one round or over several rounds and
he is certainly indifferent as to how he does so. So consider his optimal strategy in the face of
some completely mixed strategies for the other agents. Suppose these completely mixed strategies
have a high probability that the deviator himself will "accidentally" give zero tomorrow even if
contributions are not yet c(d) and (comparatively) almost no probability of any other "rnistake.
It is not hard to see that this implies that the best strategy for the deviator at this history is to
make up the entire shortfall at once. However, consider instead completely mixed strategies where
the most likely mistake is that some player other than the deviator accidentally gives some money
this period and any other mistake is almost impossible by comparison. Then the best strategy for
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the deviator is to not make up the entire shortfall this period. In short, there is no strategy on this
history for which the deviator has a best reply to any vector of completely mixed strategies close
to the equilibrium strategies. Hence there is no SUSPE.
We conjecture that there would be SUSPE's if we defined completely mixed strategies in a
manner analogous to Chatterjee and Samuelson rather than in terms of approximating games. The
reason is that there are Nash equilibria with strong robustness properties which are not approach-
able but do have outcomes in the core. For example, consider some outcome Pareto preferred to
some outcome in e1 (w). For each agent, divide the amount of wealth he is to contribute beyond the
amount at the outcome in e1 (w) into an infinite sequence. Construct the equilibrium strategies by
supposing that all agents contribute to reach the outcome in 81(w) first and then agents alternate
with agent i at his nth "turn" contributing the nth term in his sequence. If any agent deviates
from his sequence, all agents cut their subsequent contributions to zero. The fact that there is
always some amount of contributions being given in the future means that any agent who cuts
his contribution will discontinously reduce provision of the public good. If we choose the sequence
correctly. we can guarantee that the "status quo" at any point in any agent's sequence is Pareto
dominated by the proposed equilibrium. Thus no agent will wish to deviate since he knows this
will cause the status quo at the time he deviates to be the outcome. In the Appendix, we show
that if I = 2. there are very robust Nash equilibria 18 which have outcomes in the core.
To understand these results intuitively, suppose c(d) = d and that U (d w) is differentiable for
all v. Note that an approachable equilibrium of G5 for any 6> 0 can have exactly 5 be contributed
at each round up to the efficient d. For any positive 6, this process allows us to (eventually) hit
the efficient d. However, if b = 0, we can no longer take this sequence of minimal size steps up
to the efficient d. We must necessarily step from one level to another with physically possible
outcomes in between. Notice that at the efficient d, it will necessarily be true that each agent has
U (d w) < 1 as the sum of the MRS's must equal 1. Recall that the equilibria must have a finite
number of rounds. Therefore, if there is some proposed core equilibrium, any agent can reduce his
contribution at this last round by, say, k, at worst cause the level of the public good to fall to the
efficient level minus k, and be strictly better off. Thus we cannot reach the efficient outcome. By
contrast, when S > 0, along the equilibrium path, agents cannot decrease their contributions by
any nonzero amount without a discontinuous effect on the public good. The fact that U,'(d |w) < 1
does not imply that they can reduce their contribution and be better off because a reduction leads
to a more than one-for-one decrease in the level of the public good. Hence, each round is essentially
18 To be more precise, we construct strong Nash equilibria (in the sense of van Damrne 119831) in the agent-normal form.
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a unanimity vote between the status quo and some Pareto preferred outcome. Naturally the only
robust equilibrium has all agents voting for the Pareto preferred option.
The effect of the approachability requirement is most easily seen by fixing the approximation so
that contributions are in multiples of 1/n and asking how the outcome is affected by taking 6 toward
zero. When 6 falls below 1/n, we cannot have the status quo changed by one unit in a given round
unless only one person makes a contribution in that round. This cannot happen in equilibrium in
the last. round, so that the last round of contributions must yield two units. But then either of the
two contributors in the last round could deviate to zero and be strictly better off. Hence we cannot
reach the core with 6 < 1/n. Clearly, for any fixed S > 0, we can make n large enough to ensure
that this does not happen. But at the limit where b = 0, this problem is unavoidable. Generally.
we think of perfect divisibility as an approximation of "small" indivisibilities and presume that this
approximation does not affect the analysis. Here we see that indivisibilities in both the public and
private goods crucially affect the analysis, particularly the relative magnitudes of the indivisibilities.
Loosely speaking, if the indivisibilities in the public good are large relative to the indivisibilites in
the private good, then core outcomes are achieved by this contributions game. Certainly it would
seem plausible to argue that this is the usual case.
The role of discreteness or discontinuity in generating efficient outcomes has been seen other
areas of economics. For example. this role is noted by Benassy [1985] and explored in some depth
by Aghion [19851 in the context of market games. While this role may seem surprising at first
glance, this is the same role discontinuity plays in the efficiency of perfect competition. l" Perfect
competition yields efficient outcomes because each firm's demand curve as a function of its price is
discontinuous. If a firm's demand curve is continuous, it will in general set a price different from
its marginal cost because it can exploit the fact that the outcome (its demand) varies continuously
with its strategy choice to its advantage. Similarly, in the game Go, the continuity of the outcome
function with respect to contributions allows agents to shade their contributions a small amount
without consequences as disastrous for them as in Gr.
19 We are grateful to Andreu Mas-Colell for pointing out this analogy t~o us.
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V. Conclusion.
The literature on full implementation has primarily focused on necessary and sufficient condi-
tions on a choice correspondence for that correspondence to be fully implemented by some game
form. Thus the games presented are typically used for sufficiency proofs, rather than being cho-
sen for their plausibility. Not surprisingly, then, many of them do not seem plausible as natural
games that private agents. absent some social planner, would choose to play. Even the analysis
of mechanisms which are put forth as "plausibly useful," such as Groves-Clarke taxes, is focused
on mechanisms that a government might actually wish to impose and rarely on mechanisms which
private individuals might jointly use. Perhaps for this reason, the literature on private provision of
public goods has basically ignored the implementation literature, hypothesized particular games,
and demonstrated, among other things, that these games do not have efficient outcomes. We have
presented a fairly natural game of private provision of public goods which fully implements the core.
thus suggesting that the literature on full implementation has more to say about private provision
than might have been inferred to date.
An important part of our analysis has been the consideration of refinements of the Nash equilib-
rium concept. The fact that we are able to obtain efficient outcomes with such a simple game only
by considering such refinement notions is quite suggestive. To what extent are the characteristics
of the games implementing various choice correspondences driven by the equilibrium notion? In
particular, is there some sense in which the Nash equilibrium concept itself leads to the "unnatural''
appearance of the games implementing in Nash? It is clear that knowing that a game form fully
implements a choice correspondence in one equilibrium notion does not tell us that it will fully
implement in another. Furthermore, in general, one needs to know more than which equilibrium
notion is the stronger to make the determination. Thus if we wish to use full implementation to




Proof of Theorem 1
First, we define the sequence of approximating games. For G, the "maps" that comprise the
strategy sets are trivial ones, so that approximating Si is the same as approximating A1. Thus we
can approximate Si by any set of the form
{&(n), (n) + 6;,a(n) +- 26S,... , wi(n)}
where a'(n) < S, w(n) is the largest number less than or equal to w= that can be written in the
form a= (n) + k3n for some integer k, and
lim 6 = 0
n-.oo
To begin the proof, then, first suppose that Z v(w)< c. Clearly, the elimination of dominated
strategies removes all og E S(n) such that a, > V(w). Hence it is impossible to have contributions
add to c or more in the reduced game. Therefore, all agents are indifferent over all strategies in this
game and any strategy tuple in R'(S(n)) is a perfect equilibrium. 20 The limit of any such tuple
must have a sum strictly less than c. Thus we see that for such w, the set of equilibrium outcomes
is (0, w), which is the same as the core.
Now suppose that E v;(w) = c. Again, once we eliminate dominated strategies, we have
eliminated the possibility that the contributions can add to c. Hence. as above, we can make any
strategy tuple in R'(S(n)) a perfect equilibrium. In particular, we can pick out the smallest element
of each R'(Ss(n)). This guarantees, then, that there are UPE's of the game induced by such an w
with an outcome of (0, w), one of the points in the core.
The other point in the core, (1, w - v(w)), is a bit trickier. To see how to deal with this case,
simply note that in the reduced game, one perfect equilibrium has each agent choosing the largest
contribution in R 1 (S,(n)). These elements must sum to less than c for any n. However, as n -+ oc.
these largest elements necessarily approach v=. Therefore, o = v(w) is a UPE of the game induced
by such a state, which implies that (1, iv - v(w)) is a UPE outcome. It is not hard to see that there
cannot be any UPE outcome other than (0, w) and (1, iv - v) so that the set of UPE outcomes is
exactly the core for any such w.
20 For simplicity, our notation does not reflect the fact that which strategies are dominated depends on w.
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The last case, when E, vi > c, is more complex. First, we will -show that no UPE outcome
can have d = 0. Then we will verify that the all points in the core are UPE outcomes. To begin
the first task, note that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies cannot have the contributions add to
strictly more than c as any contributor would then prefer a smaller contribution. Hence all UPE's
certainly have Z, ao; c. Thus we only need to eliminate the possibility that contributions are
strictly less than c.
So suppose that this does occur in a UPE. This requires that for some large n, we have a UPE,
u (n) = ((n),... ,u(n)), where Egj (n) < c even though EJj;v> c. For each i, define vi(n) as
the largest element of Si(n) strictly less than v;. Since we have eliminated dominated strategies,
this will be the largest element of S(n). Without loss of generality, number the agents so that
v;(n) - u;(n) vj 1(n) - a+ (n) for all i. Consider the following alternative strategy for player 1.
Suppose he chooses21
i = e7l(n) + v2(n) - of(n)
Notice that we must have a' < v1. To see this, note that it certainly holds if
oj(n) r+ v2(n) - ao(n) vi(n)
or
v1(n) - o(l(n) v(n) - oa'(n)
which is implied by the way we have chosen to number the players. Since this is a UPE, we must
also have
V1(ai(n), s-1(n)) 2 V(os'i(n))
where s£'(n) is a sequence of completely mixed strategies in the reduced game converging to u*:(n)
as E l 0.22 We can rewrite this equation as
Pr' [Z i(n) 2 c - ei(n) ui(1, wi - u((n)) Pr g[a(n) c - o ui(1, tiv - oa)
where the notation "Pr' " indicates that the probability is calculated given the distribution induced
by /' (n). Rearranging yields:
(A.1) Pr'[Zgi iof(n) > c - g (nl)) nit(1,wei - oi)
Pr'[>Li ogi(n) c - o] ~ui(1, wi -oj(n))
21 -Notice that the way we have done the approximation does not guarantee that this strategy is in S1 is). This is not a
problem. For any approximation, for ns sufficiently large, it will have to be true that player 1 can choose a contribution
sufficiently close to this one. It is easy to see that this fact is sufficient for our proof.
22 For convenience, we suppress the dependence of the utility functions and the game on the state wa.
29
Notice that ui(1, w1 - a') > 0 as a' < v1. Also, since ar*(n) is a UPE, we must have ai(n) < v1 so
that ui(1, w1 - o (n)) > 0.
Let
A(i) ={a,~1 E S1(n) I ag c - a1}
i#1
(For notational simplicity, we will not denote the fact that this correspondence depends on n.
Notice, though, that it does not depend on c.) Thus A(ui) is the set of contributions for the other
agents such that d = 1 given that player 1 contributes a 1. Notice that
PrE[ZU>2 c- ai] = E Pr'[a- 1 =a,,1 )
#;41 or~1EA(c1)
For ease of exposition, let A' = A ("'(n)) and A' = A (o'). We will now show that for any &~1 E A',
there exists a vector ' 1 E A' such that
Pr'[o~1= &1] = E'(~1) PrE[asi =o'i
where .'(o1 ) 0 as e a 0. To see this, note that any &~1 E A' must contain some components
which differ from the corresponding component of O"1(n). For each ao E A - choose any i such
that i : a (n) and construct o' by replacing t5; with o (n). Note that replacing a~ 1 with 7',
reduces total contributions from the agents other than 1 by di - a= (n). However, since this is a
UPE, &g E R1 (S(n)) so that &i v(n). Hence
di - oa(n) < vi(n) - a (n) < n (n) -a2(n)
Thus agent 1's additional contribution at a' guarantees that total contributions are still at least c.
Note also that
(di; n) ,r.




s (a;(n) ; n)
Note that E(*1,) 1 0 as E 4 0 by the assumption that a' (n) is a UPE. Hence the assertion made
above is true.
Let ('(&~1) be constructed as above for each 5 ~i E A~. Let
('= max{{'(&~1,,) | 8.~, E AJ).
The fact that A' is a finite set implies that d' exists and that (* 4 0 as e 4 0.
30
Now the proof is virtually complete. Let g: A' -+ A' be the mapping described above. Then
we see that (A.1) implies
(A.2) E Zc iEA PrE[osi = g(c 1 )] u(1, w1 - a1)
EgEA' PrE[o~,1 = o'] ~ ui(1, Wi - a(n))
~1
The numerator of the fraction on the left-hand side is a sum of terms all of which also appear in the
denominator. Of course, the sum in the numerator may not include every term in the denominator
and may include some terms several times. Let g' be the vector that g(a~1) maps into most often
for &i E A' and let
£ = #{&~1 E £ " I ~1 '
(Notice that £ is implicitly a function of n and c. However, for any n, it is necessarily finite for
all c.) Consider any term in the sum in the denominator which appears fewer than £ times in the
numerator. If we add this term to the numerator so that it does appear L times, we will have
increased the left-hand side of (A.2). Hence we see that
(A.3) ] '> i ( ~ i- iU i(1, Wi - 0i(n)
Note that the right-hand side is strictly positive as a' < v1 and is independent of C. Hence if
we choose E sufficiently small, we contradict (A.3). Therefore if n is sufficiently large and Z v > c,
then any UPE of r(n) must have Ea (n) = c. This contradicts the existence of a UPE outcome
of r with d = 0.
Now we only need to establish that for any w such that E= v1(w) > c, every outcome in C(W)
is a UPE outcome. Recall that C(w) is the set of 6 = (1, w - a) with 0 < oa v(w) and Eg o; = c.
Consider first the a < v(w). For any such a, we can always find a sequence of approximating games
with a E S(n) for all n. To see this, simply choose 6, = z/n for some z and let a' (n) = a; - k6S
for the largest integer k such that this is positive. For any such a and choice of S(n). a is a strong
equilibrium of r(n) (see van Damme [1983]) and hence is a UPE. Since this is true for all n, a is a
UPE of F.
Now suppose that a < v, but that a, = v, for some i. Let B denote the set of i E I such that
o, = v, and let D = I \B. Choose any allowable approximation for S, for i E B. We wish to construct
a sequence of equilibria in which each of these agents gives v,(n). Let t(n) = EEE(v, - ;(n)). Let
k be the number of agents in D and for i e D, let a,(n) = aj + t(n)/k. For n sufficiently large, this
will necessarily have a,(n) < w, for all i E D. For i E D, construct S;(n) so that a,(n) E S;(n) for
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all n. (This is easily done by adapting the construction above.) For i E B, let oi(n) = v,(n). By
definition, then,
>2 cr(n) = ai=c
for all n. It is easy to see that u(n) is a strong equilibrium of I'(n) for all n and hence is a UPE.
Since (n)->,we see thatuoris aUPE ofTl. j
Proof of Theorem 2
We prove the theorem through a series of lemmas. Most of the lemmas apply directly to
the game induced by G2 at state w as well as to any approximating game. When the distinction
between the game and approximating game is unnecessary, we will avoid the extra notation involved
in describing the lemma for the latter. The lemmas will show that if (d, x) is a SUSPE outcome
at state w, then (d, x) E C(w). They also demonstrate some useful facts which will enable us to
prove the converse by construction. A useful definition is the following. We will say that h' is a
subhistory of A if there exists a history h" such that h' - h" = h.
Lemma 2.1. If (d. x) is a SUSPE outcome at state w, then d < d' (w).
Proof: Since the SUSPE strategy tuples are a subset of the Nash. it is clearly sufficient to demon-
strate the result for Nash outcomes. So suppose we have a Nash equilibrium a at a state w with
02 (u) = (d, z) where d > d-'(w). Let h = A}(o)-that is, h gives the equilibrium path. Let h' be
the subhistory consisting of the first m' (h) - 2 rounds. Thus h' is the history leading up to the last
round of contributions that added up to enough to alter the status quo. Let ht(h') (h') = d' < d.
Then we must have
Za (h') = c(d) - c(d')
To see why we must have equality (as opposed to a weak inequality), note that if contributions
add to more than c(d) - c(d'), each agent will receive a refund which is some fraction of this
excess. Clearly, cutting one's contribution by the amount of this excess instead gives one the entire
amount rather than a fraction. Since no further contributions were to be made. the deviator can
not contribute anything more subsequently and thus can avoid being "punished" for this deviation.
The fact that d > d' (w) implies
Zv:(dl|w) < c(d) -c(d - 1)
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so that
vs(dl| w) < c(d) - c(d)
Hence there must be some i such that u,(h') > v(d I w).
Choose any such i and consider the strategy of constructed as follows. For any history h" which
is not equal to h' nor has h' as a subhistory, a,(h") = a (h"). For any history A" other than h' with
h' as a subhistory, &,(h") = 0. Finally,
1(h')= u,(h') - v;(d Iw) - e
for some small e > 0. Clearly,
Zorj(h')-+ a(h') = Zcrj(h') - v,(d w) - E
jai j
Since d > d'(w), we must have
c(d) - c(d - 1) > Zv(diw) > v(d j w)
so that for E sufficiently small,
a (h') + og(h') > c(d - 1) - c(c')
Hence if i switches to this strategy, the outcome will have at least d - 1 as the social decision and i
will pay at least v;(d : w)+4-ec less than he would have. It is possible that he will receive a refund and
thus ends up paying still less than this. Therefore, z's expected payoff with o& minus his expected
payoff with u; is at least Ec> 0. Hence this could not be a Nash equilibrium. I
The next lemma shows that we can focus attention on equilibrium social decision. Let k(h) =
ke()(h). t(h) = t(h) (h), and r(h) = rt(h)(h).
Lemma 2.2. Suppose (d',x') is a SUSPE outcome at state w. If d' = d'(w) or if
(A.4) v(d'(w) I w) = c(d' (w)) - c(d'(u) - 1)
and d' = d'(w) - 1, then (d',x') E C(w).
Proof: Suppose not. Then the Proposition stated in the text implies that there is no price system
which supports the equilibrium outcome at state w. In other words, for any nonnegative set of
numbers, p;(d) for i E 1' and d E D, one of the following fails to hold:
(A.5) Zp;(d') = c(d')
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(A.6) (d', z) maximizes t;(d, xI| w) on {(d, zi) p=(d) + x = tV,}
(A.7) d' maximizes Zpi(d) - c(d) on D
Let h be the history generated by the equilibrium strategies and let ?r be the set of histories
that are subhistories of h. We will say that d is reached in equilibrium if there exists A' E ( such
that k(h') = d. For each i and each d that is reached in equilibrium, let
pg(d) = t;(h'(d))
where h'(d) is the history in X such that k(h') = d. For any d < d' which is not reached in
equilibrium, any player could have caused d to be reached by some deviation. In particular. for
any d < d' such that d is not reached, let h'(d) denote the longest history in A such that k(h) < d.
Then for all i and each such d, let
pi(d) = t(h'(d)) -- maxc(d) - t,(h'(d)) - >je(h'(d)), 0
Finally, for d> d let
d
p,(d) = ti(h)+ - vi(mIw)
m=d--1
Obviously, all of these numbers are nonnegative. Furthermore,
pi()= Zti(h) = c(d)
so that (A.5) holds. Similarly, by construction, for any d which is reached in equilibrium,
p,(d) = c(d)
For any d < d' such that d is not reached,
pi(d) = c (k (h'(d))) + max[c(d) - 1:t(h'(d)) - Zaoi(h'(d)), 0]
Let k = k(h'(d)) and let i+ denote the set of agents for whom the maximum is the first term. Then
we have
>Zp:(d) = c(k) + #I+[c(d) - c(k)] - ( Zo?,Q'(d))
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But
Z Za,(h'(d)) = #1J+ Z1 u,(h'(d)) + (#I+ -I1) Z y(J'(d))
iEI{+ 3i i 1+ jEI+
or
a (h'(d)) = #I+ o1 (h'(d)) - 5 o;(h'(d))
iEI+ j+i i jEI+
Hence
(h'(d)) (#P* - 1) oj(h'(d))
;c]+T it3
By assumption, though,
c(k) + 5u,(h'(d)) > c(d)
so
S:5cr,(h'(d)) > (#.P - 1)(c(d) - c(k))
iEI i#+
Substituting, we see that
5p,(d) < c(d)
For d > d, the fact that
vi(mW) < c(M) - c(m-1)
for all m > d-(w) immediately implies
5p 1 (d) < c(d)
Hence (A.7) is satisfied. Thus if we can show that (A.6) must be satisfied, we are done.
To see this, notice first that no agent would prefer any d > d' at these "prices." These prices
have each agent paying for extra streetlights exactly what they are worth to him and hence he
cannot strictly prefer d > d'. Furthermore, no agent could strictly prefer any d < d such that
d is reached in equilibrium. The price he pays for such a social decision is precisely his total
contributions up to the point where d is reached. If he strictly preferred staying at this point to
following the equilibrium path, he could have simply chosen ci(k) = 0 on all subsequent histories.
Since strictly prefetring d must imply that this strategy is different from his equilibrium strategy,
we see that he cannot strictly prefer any such d. Similarly, he could not prefer d < cf such that d
is not reached in equilibrium. The fact that d < ci implies that, at some point, total contributions
"hop over" c(d). Hence, at this point, he could cut his contribution and either guarantee that d is
reached or that some larger amount is reached. He could then refuse to contribute any more than
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this. It is easy to see that his price for this d guarantees that this choice yields utility at least as
large as ui(d, w; - p=(d) I w) and hence the fact that he does not deviate to this choice implies that
he prefers d'. Hence (A.6) holds. Therefore, (d, z') E C(w). I
Thus we have shown that if (d, z) is a SUSPE outcome at w, then, either (d, x) E C(w) or the
social decision is strictly smaller than the Pareto efficient decision. Lemma 2.5 will show that the
latter cannot be the case, thus establishing that any SUSPE outcome is in the core. The proof of
this lemma, however, requires some information about strategies which are removed by successive
elimination of dominated strategies. The following lemmas provide this information. First, we
define some new terminology. We will say that a history h E H" is reached with R (S) if there is a
a E R-(S) such that 4 (h)(e) = A. That is, there is a a E R'(S) such that h is a history generated
by a. We will say that a history h E H" can be reached from h' E H' with R"'(S) if h' is a subhistory
of h and there is a E R~(S) such that at(h) (e) = h and e4(h')(e) = h'. That is, both h and h' are
generated by a. Finally, we will say that the outcome can be changed from h E H' with R- (S) if
there is a history h' that can be reached from h with Rw (S) such that k(h') > k(h).
Lemma 2.3. Consider any w and h E Hr such that,
(a) ( min[w; - t;(h), v;(k(h)+1 \w)| < c(k(h) - 1) - c(k(h))
and, (b). h can be reached with R(S). Then the outcome cannot be changed from h with R~ (S).
Proof: First, we offer some further explanation of terminology. Recall that we have defined SUSPE's
relative to the agent-normal form. This means that the "players" we consider are ih pairs, not
simply i's. Thus we will say a strategy for ih of ogij is dominated and hence is not in R' (Sih).
The proof is by induction on d. So suppose that we have w and A satisfying (a) and (b) where
k(h)=M-1. Then
min[w, - ti(h), v (M | w); < c(M) - c(M - 1)
Clearly, for any ih such that k(h) = M - 1, any a such that
is not in R1 (S h) and hence is not in R- (Sih). Obviously, any Cih such that
aa>w- t (h)
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is not feasible and hence is also not in R- (Sth). Therefore, for any o E R' (S), it must be true that
Zuaz< c(M)- c(M-1)
so that the outcome cannot be changed from h with R' (S).
To complete the proof, suppose that for some d' > 2, we have shown the following induction
hypothesis for d > d':
(H) If h can be reached with R'~(S), k(h) = d, and
(A.8) Zmin[w - ti(h), v(d-- 1 w)] < c(d+ 1) - c(d),
then the outcome cannot be changed from h with R'(S).
We wish to show that (H) holding for all d> 2d' implies (H) for d = d' - 1. This will complete the
proof. So suppose (H) does not hold for d = d - 1. Then there is an h' E H' such that h' can be
reached from h with R -(S) with k(h') > d'. We will derive a contradiction to this by induction.
To begin this induction, notice that we cannot have k(h') = M. This would require
M
uih > L vi(m w)
m=d'
for some ih. To see this, note that (A.8) implies
M
Z minw; - t;(h), v (m w)1 < c(M) - c(d)
m=d+1 i
because v,(m w) is strictly decreasing in m and c(m + 1) - c(m) is strictly increasing in m. But
the left-hand side is weakly larger23 than
min w: - t(h), v(m | w)
ma=d
so that
Z min [wi - t4(h), ( v;(m Iw)J < c(M) - c(d')
23 Recall that all terms in the minimum are positive. It is not difficult to show that for any a, b, and c, all positive,
min(a, b) + min(a, c) > min(a, b + c).
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Obviously, any such Ujj is dominated so ch 0 R* (S1,). This provides us with the basis for an
induction on k(h'). So suppose that we have shown that we cannot have k(h') > m' for some
m' > d' + 1. We wish to show that this implies that we cannot have k(h') = m'-- 1, which will
provide the contradiction needed to complete the proof.
First, notice that the fact that k(h') cannot be greater than or equal to m' and the induction
hypothesis (H) for d 2 d' implies that any oi such that
m -1
o f > vi(m I w)
m=d1
cannot be in R~(S). This is because it is impossible to increase d beyond m' - I and so no
contribution larger than the right-hand side could possibly be worthwhile. But then
m'-1
ih >j vM w)
rn=d1
for all 0 ih E R-(Sih). Together with the fact that feasibility requires og 5 w - ti(h), this implies
Hence (A.8) coupled with an analogous argument to the above implies
Z7ih< c(m - 1)- c(d)
so that we cannot have k(h') = m' - 1. I
The next lemma uses this one to show what some strategies in R" (S) must be. To define these
strategies, let
A (h) = {aE Sh!a; < vi(k(h) +j1|w) and Zai =c(k(h) + 1) - c(k(h))}
Si = {ai E Sih | 3a,: with (a=, a,,) E A(h)}
k(h)
I11= {h E H' ti(h) Zv,(d Iw) and h can be reached with R'(S)}
d= 1
Then we have
Lemma 2.4. For all i, all w, and all A E II,
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Proof: If A (h) = 0, then So = 0 and so it is trivially true that SS C RW(Sih). Let
HI= { h E I|A(h) #0}
Let d(w) = d~(w) - 2 if (A.4) holds and let it equal d" (w) - 1 otherwise. Thus d(w) is one smaller
than the smallest possible Pareto efficient decision. For h such that k(h) > d(w), we must have
A (h) = 0. Hence h E H implies k(h) < d(w).
The proof is by induction on k(h). To begin, consider any h E i such that k(h) = d(w). Suppose
first that d(w) = d' (w) - 1. Consider the following strategy tuple. For all ih' such that h' # h and
h' is a subhistory of h, choose strategies in R *(Sih,) which lead to h. Since E I, such strategies
must exist. For all ih' such that h' # h and h is a subhistory of A', choose any strategy in R'u(Shi).
By Lemma 2.3, these strategies must not have the contributions adding up to enough to change the
outcome. For all ih' such that h' : h and neither history is a subhistory of the other, choose any
strategy in R'~(Sihr). Finally, for history h, choose auj so that the vector 0 h E A (h). The fact that
h E IH together with our assumption that wi> U1(M | w) implies that these strategies are feasible.
Notice that for each i, the strategy 0 ih is the unique best reply for ih to the strategies of ~ (ih).
This is true because any reduction in the contribution by ih causes contributions not to add up at
h and hence i is worse off. Similarly, since contributions will not sum up at the next stage, there is
no possible advantage to increasing one's contribution since refunds are only a fraction of the extra
contributed. 24 Hence for each ih. ih E R'(Sih) as ~Ch E S~(sh). But then for all ih, og, E R2 (Sh)
as C(h) E RI(3,(ih)) and so on. Therefore, oga E R'(Sih) for all ih. Hence if d(w) = d~(w) - 1, then
for all h such that k(h) = d(w), we have the desired result.
Suppose instead that d(w) = d- (w) - 2. Again, consider any h E I such that k(h) = d(w).
Notice that for any h' such that k(h') = d- (w) - 1, it is certainly dominated to give more than
v(d' (w) w). Hence the only way contributions at h' could possibly sum to c(d-"(w)) - c(d'(w) - 1)
is for each agent to receive a zero increment to their payoff at this stage. Hence the issue of whether
or not contributions add up at h' is irrelevant to payoffs at the preceding stage. In other words, we
can choose eih' for each ih' exactly as above and the same argument will apply. Hence we see that
for any h E H such that k(h) =d(w), we have Si ; R"(Sih).
This provides us with the basis for the induction. So consider the following induction hypoth-
24 To be more precise, unless ih is the only contributor at hs, his refund will be a fraction of the excess so that he would
be strictly worse off increasing his contribution. If ihs is the only contributor at hs, then he is indifferent between this
contribution and any larger one leading to the same outcome. However, the smaller contribution cannot be dominated by
as larger one. Ti, see this, simply note that the two contributions do have equal payoffs ragaiunst these strategies Ifowever,
the smaaller 'rne is a better reply against anty positive contributions by the other players at this round. hn other words,
comparing this contribution and any other, we see that this one is either strictly better against these strategies or is
strictly better against sorne other strategies. This fact is sufficient for the subsequent arguments.
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esis:
(H) For all h E H such that k(h) d, Sih R(Sah).
Suppose we have demonstrated (H) for all d > d' where d' is between 1 and d(w). We wish to show
that this implies (H) for d = d' - 1.
First, notice that for any h E H, the set A (h) must have at least two elements. To see this,
notice that A (h) is only nonempty when
v;(k(h) + 1! w) > c(k(h) + 1) - c(k(h))
Obviously there will exist many choices of a such that ai < vj(k(h) + 11( w) and such that the as
sum to c(k(h) -e 1) - c(k(h)). Importantly, notice that this will also be true for the approximating
games for n sufficiently large. Hence we see immediately that there are strategies in R' (S) such
that contributions will not sum to c(k(h)+1) - c(k(h)) for any h such that k(h) > d'. Simply choose
the smallest element of S, for each ih'. Then we can use this fact to construct cih, analogously to
the above and the same arguments will establish the claim. I
We are finally ready to complete the proof that the set of SUSPE outcomes is a subset of the
core.
Lemma 2.5. If (A.4) holds and (d,x) is a SUSPE outcome at w, then d> d'(U) - 1. If (A.4) does
not hold and (d, z) is a SUSPE outcome at w, then d = d' (w).
Proof: Suppose not. Then there is a state w and a SUSPE at w, o, such that 02(g) = (d, z) and
d violates the statement of the lemma. Since c is a SUSPE, there must be a sequence {u(n)}
converging to a such that cr(n) is a SUSPE of the nth approximating game for each n. Let h;, =
h-(o(n))-that is. h; is the equilibrium path. Let h', be the subhistory of h, consisting of the
first m' (h) - 1 components. Thus h', gives h; up to the round at which contributions do not add
up to enough to change the status quo. So, for n sufficiently large, k(h',) = d and Z czhi(n) <
c(d + 1) - c(d). In what follows, we omit the n subscript on h,.
Recall that. by definition, if u(n) is a SUSPE, then, for all ih, ag,,(n) is a best response to any
vector of completely mixed strategies for the other agents close to "~ h(n). We will find an ih and
a vector of completely mixed strategies which provides a contradiction. For obvious reasons, the
history we choose is h'. So choose any i such that 0ih, < v,(d+±1 | w). The fact that the valuations
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sum to more than c(d + 1) - c(d) and the contributions do not implies that such an i must exist.
The construction of the completely mixed strategies is quite simple. For h # h', let the probability
that jh chooses ojh(n) be 1 - ek for some large k. The remaining ek of probability is spread over
the strategies in R-(Sjh(n)) in any way. For h = h', let the probability that jh chooses aTh(n) be
1 - E. Consider the remaining e of probability to be put on jh's other possible strategies. We put
probability ye/ (1 + y) (for some large y) on a particular strategy which we will denote a-h(n). For
now, we will let oha(n) = x(n). (The argument is not affected if z;(n) = ajh(n).) The remaining
probability for jh for h = h' is spread over the other strategies in R-(Syh(n)) in any fashion. We
will show that there must exist an zj(n) E R'(Sh,(n)) for j # i such that ~h',(n) is not a best reply
to this vector of completely mixed strategies for ~r(ih).
First. note that the fact that d violates the condition stated in the lemma means that
(A.9) v(d+ 1 i w) > c(d + 1) - c(d)
Let
={j 6 \{i}| jh, < vj ( d+ |)
It is easy to see that (A.9) implies that J is nonempty. (A.9) also implies that, for all n sufficiently
large, there exists a set B C J satisfying
(A.1O) o:v(d+ 1 , w) -- 1: a(n)-r v(d- 1 | w) > c(d+ 1) - c(d)
jEB j Bj:#i
as this is true for B = J. The fact that the power set of J is finite implies that there is a finite
number of sets B satisfying (A. 10). Hence we can certainly find a set with the property that B C 7.
B satisfies (A.10), and no subset of B other than B itself satisfies (A.10). Choose any such B and
call this set B'.
We will now show that for n sufficiently large, we can choose z(n) for j E B' U {i} so that
(A.11) ojh'r(n) < zj(n) < min[vj(d-+ 1 | w), w, -
(A.12) Ej zj(n) + zg(n) + >i1 Ughr(n) =, c(d + 1) -cd)
and
(A.13) ~ E zjnj+og n+ ,(n cd 1i c
41
where the notation =,, indicates that contributions are at least c(df+ 1) - c(d) and are strictly
smaller than c(d+ 1) - c(d) + 3n.
To see this, first note that the fact that the original strategies were an equilibrium with con-
tributions not adding up at h' implies that v (d+ 1 w) < wy - t(h'). This is true because
M
Wj E v(m I w)
m=1
by assumption, so vj(d + 1 | w) >wj - t5(h') would imply
d
t,(h) > Z1v(ml| w)
m=1
But this means that j gets a payoff strictly less than u3. Since j can always choose cj = 0 and
guarantee himself a payoff at least equal to wy, this could not be an equilibrium. Hence we can
rewrite (A.11) as
ah(n) < zj(n) < vj(d-,- 1: w)
Since for each j E J U {i}, ojh(n) is bounded away from v(d-- 1 w), we can obviously find zy(n)
in this range for n sufficiently large. Therefore, (A.11) can certainly be satisfied.
To see that (A.11) and (A.12) can be satisfied simultaneously, simply note that the strict
inequality in (A.10) means that for n sufficiently large, we can choose zy(n) close enough to vj(d-1
w) to guarantee an inequality in (A.12) while satisfying (A. 11). We can then lower the zj 's gradually
to achieve the (approximate) equality required by (A.12). Since this is an equilibrium in which
contributions do not add up, we must have
Z ,hf(n) + v(d+±1 i w) < c(d + 1) - c(d)
j*-i
so that we can reach this equality without violating ah, (n) < zj(n). Clearly, the equality in (A.12)
combined with ahih(n) < z(n) implies (A.13) immediately.
Now we only need to choose zj(n) for j $ B-. We will let z;(n) equal the smallest contribution
in Sg,F(n) for j # i, j # B~. We have two facts left to establish. First, we will demonstrate that
ug,,(n) is not a best response for ih' to the vector of completely mixed strategies constructed in this
fashion. Then we will show that zj(n) E R' (Sjh,(n)) for all j so that this is an allowable vector of
completely mixed strategies for the reduced game. This will imply that o(ni) is not a S USPE for n
large and hence that a cannot be a SUSPE.
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To complete the first task, we will show that z;(n) is a strictly better response for ih' to this
vector than is 0 h (n) for all e sufficiently small. To see this, notice that it is sufficient for our purposes
to suppose that the outcome of randomization by the agents other than ih' is that jh' chooses either
ojhl(n) or zj(n) and, for all h # h', jh chooses ujh(n). If we can demonstrate that x;(n) yields a strictly
higher expected payoff for ih' under this assumption, then we can choose y and k large enough that
za(n) will be a strictly better response to the vector of completely mixed strategies. Under this
supposition, the expected payoff to ih' from zx(n) minus the expected payoff from aug (n) is at least
the probability that contributions from jh' # ih' is at least c(d + 1) - c(d) - z4(n) times a positive
number minus the probability that contributions from jh' # ih' is at least c(d+ 1) - c(d) - oih,(n)
times a positive number.2 5 Notice that the former probability is a sum of the form:
1 y)#
where B CI \ {i} such that:
(A.14) S zj (n) S- ,%(n)+ ;(n) c(d+ 1) - c(d)
jEB jeBj~i
The latter probability is a sum of the same form except that B must satisfy
(A.15) 5 x(n)± 5a Oh(n)-ihI,(n) c(d-r1) - c(d)
jEB jB,j:i
We wish to show that this difference is strictly positive for E sufficiently small. By construction,
we know that there is no set B C B~ which satisfies (A.14). Furthermore, for all j # i such that
j ( B', ogh(n) zj(n) so that no set B which does not contain B' can satisfy (A.14). However,
B' certainly satisfies (A.14) and there may be sets B with B' as a subset which satisfy (A.14).
However, notice that (A.12) and the fact that j # i and j B" implies hrf(n) xj(n) means that
there is no B satisfying (A.15). Hence this difference must be strictly positive.
Thus if the c,.h,(n) strategies we have constructed are elements of R' (S,hI (n)) for each jh' . we
are done. But notice that the zJ(n) for all j are in S;, (n) and hence, by Lemma 2.4, must be in
R"(Shh(n)). I
We have now established that for any w, the set of SUSPE outcomes at w is a subset of C(w).
Now we only need to show that any outcome in C(w) is a SUSPE outcome at w. This is not as
straightforward as the analogue was for Theorem 1 because of the many unreached information
25 Notice that this implicitly assumes that i will not subsequently contribute more than his valuation for whatever further
streetlights are built. Since the SUTSPE's are a subset of the subgame perfect equilibria and this is implied by subgame
perfection, we see that this must hold.
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sets in equilibrium. Strict perfection of the equilibrium essentially requires strict perfection at
every information set, often difficult to verify (or satisfy). This is where successive elimination of
dominated strategies proves especially useful. Recall that Lemma 2.3 showed that this elimination
implies that information sets where adding streetlights is not possible as a Pareto improvement
need not concern us. The lemma showed that there are no strategies available to the players that
can affect the outcome at that point and hence any specification of strategies in R"'(S) for these
information sets will not affect whether or not the strategy tuple is a SUSPE.
We now show how to construct a SUSPE for a state w and a given element of C(w). Obviously,
if d- (w) = 0, Lemma 2.3 implies that our task is trivial. So consider any w for which d'(w) 2 1 and
any (d.x) E C(w). Since we can choose any approximating action sets we like, we will suppose that
the nth approximating game has all feasible contributions being integer multiples of 1/n. That is.
for all i and n.
Ai(n) = {0, 1/n, 2;'n,... , (w,),}
where for any real number a, (a), is the largest integer multiple of 1/'n less than or equal to a. First,
suppose that (A.4) does not hold so that d = d' (w) or let d = d' (w) - 1. Furthermore. suppose
that for each i.
z>w - Z v;(dw)
d~dx (w )
For each i and n, choose d terms, which we will denote p;(rn n), in such a way as to guarantee
that
(A.16) p;(m I n) =, c(m) - c(m- 1), V m < d, n E N,
( A.18) p;(m ; n)= (p i(m | n) n,Vi E ,n E N,rn < d.
Let H(n) denote the set of histories of length less than or equal to d on which
Pm(h) = p(m | n), V m S £(h)
Note that H(n) contains exactly one history of each length less than or equal to d, including the
"empty history," e. For each m K d, let h(mni n) denote the history of length it in Hf(n). The final
restriction on the numbers to be chosen, then, is
(A.19) w;- ti(N(d I n)) E (z;- 1/n,;z + 1/n)
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This is clearly possible.
Our objective is to choose strategies so that these numbers are the contributions along the
equilibrium path up to h(d I n). By Lemma 2.3, we will not need to consider histories such that
k(h) > d. To construct the equilibrium strategies, we begin by partitioning the set of histories such
that r(h) = 1 into four sets. The first set is those histories which Lemma 2.3 tells us we can ignore.
That is,
H(n~w)={hEHi(n) k(h) > dork(h)< dbut
>(minjv(k(h) + 1 | w), wi - ti(h))),, < c(k(h) + 1) - c(k(h))}
where Hij(n) is the set of possible histories with r(h) = 1. The second set is also one we can
essentially ignore. Let
Ho(n I w) = {h E H(n) wi > ti(h) for exactly one i and h 6 Ho(n w)}
That is. this is the set of histories for which exactly one person has wealth left and this person
wishes to change the outcome. Once we reach such a history, clearly, this person's optimal strategy
is rather trivial. Notice that considerations of how he "trembles" on subsequent histories is also
essentially irrelevant as failing to contribute enough to change the outcome when he has not yet
reached his favorite d is dominated as is changing the outcome to a d larger than his favorite one.
Since an individual cannot unilaterally cause others to lose their entire wealth, this histories will
not concern us very much.
The third set is an important one. This is the set of histories consistent with our chosen
equilibrium path which have not yet reached k(h) = d. That is, the third set is
Ho(n w) = H(n) \ {h(d 1 n)}
That is. Ho is the set of histories with no deviations from the equilibrium path. The fourth set,
which we will partition further in a moment, contains all other histories in Hi(n).
We will let oih(n) be any strategy in R -(Sih(n)) for any h E Hj(n I w) or H(n I w). For any
h E Ho(n | w), o'h (n) = pi(k(h)+ 1 | n). It is easy to see that no agent at any history in Ho wishes to
deviate downward. Reducing one's contribution at such a history is strictly worse than the proposed
equilibrium strategy as this causes contributions to fail to add up to c(k(h) + 1) - c(k(h)). Since
each person's contribution is strictly less than his valuation for k(h)+±1, this change must make him
strictly worse off. What is more difficult is guaranteeing that no agent wishes to deviate upward
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in his contribution. Since such a deviation will not end the game, this can only be established by
assigning strategies off the equilibrium path properly.
To do so, consider the histories not in HO, Ho, or Ho. Without loss of generality, we can write
any such history, say h, as h' - h", where h' is the longest subhistory of h which is an element of HO
and £(h") E [1, d - t(h')]. This is true because e, the empty history, is in Ho. We will write this
decomposition as ho(h) -ho(h) whenever there may be some ambiguity about which history we are
decomposing in this fashion or what set h' belongs to. Let Hl(n ; w) denote the set of histories
in Hi(n) not in HG, Ho, or Ho such that £(h"(h)) = 1. For these histories, the first deviation from
the equilibrium path has just occurred. Note that every history not in Ea, HG, or Ho must have a
subhistory in Hi.
Recall that we only need to guarantee that no agent wishes to deviate upward from a history
in H0. However, we do also need to guarantee that no agent wishes to deviate from the prescribed
strategy at a history in Hl. Clearly, if we choose strategies at Hl to guarantee that contributions
just sum to the costs and each person's contribution is strictly less than his valuation, then, as
above, we will guarantee that no individual wishes to deviate downward at a history in Hj'. At
the same time, we should choose the contributions to punish anyone who deviated upward from a
history in Ho to cause the succeeding history to be in Hj. If we can do this, then we will simply
need to carry out an analogous construction for a set of histories which have a deviation from the
equilibrium path from Hl to make sure that no one wishes to deviate upwards from their proposed
equilibrium strategy in Hg. Obviously, we will do this in an analogous manner. Since we can only
have a finite number of periods of deviations, this procedure must end and we will be done.
To see how to do this, consider a history h E Hj'(n w). Suppose t(h) = t(I(k(h) n)).
That is, total contributions net of refunds by each person is exactly what it would have been on
the equilibrium path. This is only possible if every person deviates upward by exactly the same
percentage and thus requires multi-lateral deviations. Since such histories cannot be reached from
the equilibrium path by a unilateral deviation, they will not concern us very much. For such an h.
we set a h(n) = p(k(h) + 1 | n).
Now suppose t(h) # t(N(k(h) | n)). Since
~jti( h) =c(kh,
this implies that some agents have larger net wealth than they would have had on the equilibriurn
path and others have smaller net wealth. Since a unilateral deviation cannot keep r = 1 and
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achieve larger net wealth, it is those agents who have smaller net wealth that we need to "punish."
Accordingly, we will choose an equilibrium path from this point which ends up giving those who
now have a smaller net wealth than they should have a smaller net wealth at the end than they
would have had. One complication in doing so is that some agents may have lost so much net
wealth that it is no longer possible to reach d without some agent contributing more than his
valuation or more than his remaining wealth. Notice, though, that if we ensure that at each status
quo decision, a deviator has lower net wealth than he would have had at that decision along the
equilibrium path, then he is unambiguously worse off deviating even if the social decision changes.
This is true because the difference in his ultimate net wealth along the two paths is less than his
willingness to pay for the larger social decision. (Clearly, the loss of wealth cannot make it possible
to reach a social decision larger than d.) The most straightforward way to punish deviators and to
delineate the cases where the loss of wealth must affect the path through the game tree from h is
to suppose that the original equilibrium contributions are continued from here if possible. We now
construct the histories that would result if this were done. If these are feasible, they will constitute
the equilibrium path from h. So let H(h, n) denote the set of h' with h as a subhistory such that
for all m < £(h'), m > £(h),
Pm(h') = p(m+ k(h) - £(A)|n)
That is, H(h, n) is the set of histories consistent with these contributions being given once we reach
h. As before, for any m > £(h). m < d - k(h) + e(h), let h(m h, n) denote the (unique) history of
length m in H(h, n). First, suppose that H(h, n) C H' (n). That is, it is feasible to continue with
the original equilibrium contributions. For such a history, we suppose ihg(n) = pi(k(h) - 1 n) as
before.
Suppose instead that H(h, n) 9 WH(n). Let h'(h, n) denote the shortest history in H(h, n) not
in H (n) and let k~ = k(h' (h)) and t~ = t(h- (h)). There are three possible cases to consider. First,
it may be true that
Z(minvt1(k'. 1 w), witi;; < c4k --41) - c(k' )
In this case, Lemma 2.3 implies that contributions cannot add up at h'(h). In this case, our
specification of strategies is irrelevant.
The second possibility is that
(A.20) Z(in~v(k' +i 1 |w). w; - t],= Z in~v(k' + 1 | w), w, - t)= c(k' + 1) - c(k')
For these histories, it is possible that contributions add up but only if everyone gives the most that
they are able/willing to pay. It is not immediately clear whether or not there are contributions in
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R-(Sih) that will add up at such a stage. If so, then those who have w; - t; < o;(k'+ 1 I w) must
contribute w; - t. This is true because with any small probability that contributions will add up
at this stage, those who gain a strictly positive amount from having this outcome will necessarily
give the unique contribution for them which makes this possible. If there are no contributions in
R' (Sih) such that the outcome can be changed at this history, then, clearly, the contributions are
irrelevant. We will suppose that each person gives the largest element of R' (S,)) at such a history.
Note that contributions cannot possibly add up at the stage following such a history.
Finally, the last case is where
(min[v(k" + 1 1w), tw_ - t=]) > c(k' + 1) - c(k")
1
To construct the strategies from this point on, first, define I numbers. p=(k(h'-) 1 ih. n). These
numbers should satisfy:
0 < p;(k(h")+ 1 h, n) < min v(k(h~)+11w), w; - t,(h*)j
p:(k(h-) +1 n) =n c(k(h-) + 1) - c(k(h-))
p;(k(h~) + 1 n) = (p(k(h~) + 1 |n))/
Let E"~(k".h, n) denote that history of length £(h'(h))+± 1 which has h"'(h) as a subhistory and
Pe(h"'(h))+i(h'(k , h, n)) = p(k(h') +T1 n)
Then we also want pi(k' + 1 n) to satisfy
(A.21) ti(h'(k', h, n)) > ti(h(k", n)), for all i such that ti(h) > ti(h(k(h), n)
Again, it is not hard to see that this is possible. For the next stage along the equilibrium path
from h'(h), repeat the same procedure described above.
This procedure defines the equilibrium path from h for any h E Ha. Let the set of histories
which follow this - from some h E H; be H1 (n I w). This set includes every history in H; plus some
histories for which £(h'g'(h)) > 2. Thus this is the set of histories with one deviation followed by
equilibrium play thereafter. Consider the set of histories, h, in H (n) but not in Hg, H , Ho, or H1.
Analogously to the above, we can decompose any such h into h'-.h" where h' is the longest subhistory
of h such that h E H1. Let h'1(h) - h'('(h) denote this decomposition and let Hj(n I w) denote the
set of such histories for which £(h'i(h)) = 1. These are histories which contain a deviation from the
equilibrium path at some point and a second deviation in the previous period. Simply imitate the
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construction given above to construct an equilibrium path from a history in HZ with the following
alteration. Let h denote a history in Hj. Then we rewrite (A.21) to insure that any agent with
lower net wealth at h than at the equilibrium path from hi(h) has lower net wealth at each step of
the path from h compared to the path from hi(h).. Clearly, we can define H2 as the set of histories
with exactly two deviations, define H3 analogously to the above, and so on.
Since the number of rounds of contributions is necessarily finite, this procedure must eventually
terminate. It is not hard to see that the resulting strategies will have the property that for any ih,
if (A.20) does not hold, h E Hj (n), and h is not in Ho or Ho, then the prescribed strategy for ih
is a strict best reply to the strategies of (ih). Hence this strategy is a best reply to any vector
of completely mixed strategies for (ii) close to a~(ih) (n). Lemma 2.3 covers the strategies for
histories in H(; and, as we argued above, histories in Ho are straightforward. Finally, as argued
above, histories for which (A.20) holds do not affect the analysis. Hence u(n) is a SUSPE for all n.
Notice, of course, that as n -+ oo. the outcome approaches the point in the core that we sought.
Now consider the case where (A.4) holds and we wish to achieve an outcome with d = d' (w).
Here we can certainly follow a path to an outcome with d = d"(w) - I and then have'contributions
at the last stage equal to the largest elements of R' (Sih)) for each i and that history. Since
vi(d(w) I w) = c(d'(w)) - c(d-(w) - 1)
and no one will contribute more than their valuation at this stage by Lemma 2.3, we see that this
will either have contributions fall short or will have add up exactly. To see that (in the limit)
the former will hold, consider the way dominated strategies are eliminated. Contributing more
than one's valuation is not a dominated strategy until the possibility of getting past d-(w) has
been eliminated by removal of other dominated strategies. Up till this point, it is certainly not
dominated to contribute any amount less than one's valuation. Hence at the step in the successive
removal where contributing more than one's valuation at this history is eliminated, strategies where
one contributes strictly less must still be possible. But then contributing less will not be eliminated
as no strategy for ih can affect the outcome and hence no strategy left for ih cannot possibly be
dominated. But this implies that the largest element in R- (Sih ( n)) must converge to v;(d'-(w) I w).
Finally, consider a core outcome with
d
z= wi- ( v;(m w)
m=1
It is easy to see that we can allow i to contribute slightly less than his valuation at each stage and
let the difference between his contribution and valuation go to zero as n -+ 00.
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Proof of Lemma
First, we show that o -- >0 by induction. To begin the induction, recall that kJ (A) is defined
as the largest multiple of b such that
tPi(h) > c(k)
Obviously, as b 0, the continuity of c(-) implies that kJ -+ kl. Similarly, it is clear from this that
tr -+ to. So consider r . Recall that
r(h) = 1, if k (h) > S;
0, otherwise.
and
ro1 = 1, if ko (h) > 0;
(0, otherwise.
Notice that rj -+ ro, if for all 6 sufficiently small, re(h) = r1 (h). If k (h) > 0, then for S sufficiently
small, kl must be strictly larger than S as kl is converging to I >0 and & is converging to0. Hence
for all h such that kh (h) > 0, rF(h) = r(h) for all S sufficiently small. So suppose that k(h) = 0.
But this is only possible if P1(h) = 0 in which case kj(h) = 0 also. Hence, obviously. rj -r1.
Hence oi - o.
So suppose that for some m', we have shown that of -- oo for all m <im' - 1. We wish to show
that this implies os"' -> oo''. It is easy to see that the induction hypothesis implies kr' -+ kf"' and
similarly for tv'. An argument analogous to the one above establishes the result for r;"', completing
the proof. Hence o converges pointwise to oo on H.
It is easy to see that this result implies that mr converges to mo pointwise on H and hence
that O converges to 00 pointwise as well.
We now wish to show that this implies that the set of possible histories for b converges to H,
as S 0 in the sense defined in (10) and (11). Recall that H is that subset of H such that
(A.23) t"'(h) w, for all in
and
(A.24) Pm(h) = e, for all mn such that rs"1 (h) = 0.
So consider any h E H6. For all S sufficiently small, the fact that we will have rf"(h) = rg'(h) immie-
diately implies (A.24). Furthermore, notice that to"'(k) = Zm~<? tPm,(h) while tf"(h) is necessarily
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weakly smaller than the same quantity. Hence (A.23) must hold. Therefore, for all 6 sufficiently
small, h E HF. Now consider any h H;. If (A.23) is violated at 6 = 0, then the fact, that tm
converges pointwise to to implies that (A.23) will be violated for all S sufficiently small. Similarly,
if (A.24) is violated for 6 = 0, then convergence will again imply that (A.24) is violated for all S
sufficiently close to zero. Therefore, h H; for 6 sufficiently small. Hence (10) and (11) hold. so
H; -- H. In fact, for 6 sufficiently small, H CH6.
It is easy to show that (12) holds. The fact that t(h) < to'(h) implies that for any h E H;, if
o,(h) satisfies this feasibility condition for 6 = 0, it must do so for 6 close to zero. Therefore, (12)
holds and SF -- So.
Obviously, the function translating strategies into histories is entirely unaffected by 6. There-
fore, the fact that O; -+ O implies immediately that OF -> Oo. I
Proof of Theorem 3
We wish to show that CC() Go(w) as S 0. Since the set of SUSPE outcomes at state w
in Gc is the former, this implies that for S sufficiently small, the set of SUSPE outcomes of G will
be approximately Co(w). Recall that we say that Cr (w) converges to Co(w) if for all S sufficiently
small. (d',x') E Co(w) implies (d',z') E CG(w) and (d,x') c Co(w) implies (d',x') CF(w).
To see that this holds, consider any (/, z') E Co(w). Clearly, if d E Dec, then (d', z') E CF(w).
Recall from the Proposition that an outcome is in the core if there is a price system supporting it.
Any price system supporting the allocation for Do will work when restricted to De. Hence, choosing
the sequence of S's to be the set of S such that 6,,= /n, we see that for all (d', x') E Co(w), there
is a sequence {Cs(W)}EA such that (d',z') E CF(w) for all b E A.
So consider any ( ) Co(w). We wish to show that for S sufficiently small, (d, z') G C (w).
To see this, notice that there is no price system supporting (d, x). This implies that for any set of
non-negative, upper semicontinuous functions, at least one of the following must fail:
(A.25) ~p;(d') = c(d')
(A.26) (d',xr') maximizes tt,(d,; z|w) on {(d, z,) |p,(d) +t z;= w,}, Vi
(A.27) d' maximizes p;(d) - c(d)
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Consider, then, any set of non-negative numbers pi(d) for i E I and d E Dc for which (A.25)
holds. It will necessarily be true that (A.26) or (A.27) will fail to hold if the d which maximizes
the relevant function with respect to Do is in D6. Again, for S sufficiently small, either this d or
one very close to it will be in D6. Hence a price system supporting (d', z') for De will not exist so
that (d,z') Q(w). I
Proof of Theorem 4
First, we show that any approachable outcome must have d = d(w). Then we will show that
any outcome in e1 (w) is an approachable outcome. Finally, we will give an example in which there
is an approachable outcome which is not in e1 (w), indicating that the set of approachable outcomes
in general includes more than 8 1(w).
So suppose we have an approachable outcome (d', ') with d' d(w). Suppose, first, that
< d(w). This cannot be a Nash equilibrium, then, as any person for whom d' < I(w) can
do better by contributing c(d(w)) - c(d). Hence we must have d d(w). Suppose, then. that
if > d(w). Consider the sequence of approximating games. In any game in the sequence, the
number of rounds of contributions is finite. Hence there is a last round in any equilibrium in such
an approximating game. But then anyone contributing in that round can cut their contribution
by as much as c(d) - c(d(w)) and be strictly better off. Hence the outcome in any approximating
game must have d < d(w) and so d = d(w).
To see that any outcome in 0 1 (w) is an appraochable outcome, simply consider the following
strategies. Let (d',x') be some outcome in e 1(w). For the empty history. each agent except one
contributes Kwi - i).. Some agent with d=(w) = (w) makes up the extra contribution required by
the approximation. On subsequent histories, if one's past contributions (not netting out refunds)
totals at least se(n), rh(n) = 0. Otherwise, auh(n) is the difference between one's past contributions
and uie(n). It is easy to see that for all ih, jh (n) is a best reply to a(=h)(n). Hence u(n) is a Nash
equilibrium (in fact, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) and hence its limit as n - yoc is an
approachable equilibrium. Clearly, the limiting outcome is (d, z').
To see that there can be approachable outcomes not in 0 1(w). suppose I = 3. Suppose that for
some w, two agents, 1 and 2, have U:(d |w) = 31og(1+i d) and the third has U3(d w) = 2log(1+ d).
Suppose c(d) = d. It is easy to see that
dli(w) = d2(wc) = 2
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and
d3 (w) = 1
Hence every outcome in e1 (w) has d = 2 and z3 = w3. As we have just shown, every approachable
outcome must have d = 2 as well. Hence if there is an approachable outcome which is not in 81(w),
it must have z3 < w3. Consider, then, the following strategies.
os(h) = 1 - ts(h), if t3 (h) < 1 and ti(h)=t2(h)=0;
0, otherwise.
To define the strategies for 1 and 2, let
A, ={h E H~ | t3(h) < 1 or there exists a subhistory of h, h',
such that t3 -(h') > 0 and ti(h') = 0}
A = {hE H~ t3 (h);>1 and ti(h) = t2 (h) = 0}
.4 = {h E H there exists a subhistory of h, h', such that ti(h') > 0 and t3 -i(h') = 0}
Then for i= 1, 2, let
10, if hE A ;
a;(h) = (2 - t3 (h))/2, if h E At;
2 - t3(h), otherwise.
In other words, neither 1 nor 2 contributes any money until 3 has contributed at least 1. Once 3
has contributed this. 1 and 2 each contribute half the difference between 3's contributions and 2.
If either 1 or 2 deviates from this by contributing early, the other two players do not contribute
anything and the deviator contributes the difference between contributions to date and 2. Notice
that for each ih, ugo is a best reply to U~(h). Hence these strategies constitute a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
To guarantee that the same is true of a sequence of approximating games, simply choose the
approximation games so that 1/2 is a multiple of 1/n. Then all contributions on the equilibrium
path will be multiples of 1/ n. Since any deviation in an approximating game will have to be a
multiple of 1/n, the subsequent contribution required for the deviator will also be a multiple of
1/n and so will be feasible. Hence this equilibrium is the limit of a sequence of subgame perfect
equilibria of approximating games. I
Equilibria that are not Approachable
In this section of the Appendix, we consider equilibria that are not approachable for the case
of I = 2. We show that there are very robust Nash equilibria in this set which do have outcomes
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in the core. In particular, many core outcomes are outcomes of a strong Nash equilibrium in the
agent-normal form. A strong Nash equilibrium (using the definition of van Damme [1983]) is a
strategy tuple for which each agent is choosing his unique best reply. We will also see that there
are many outcomes not in the core which can be so reached. Our contruction does not yield all core
outcomes, but this does not imply that these other core outcomes cannot be strong Nash outcomes.
For simplicity, we assume c(d) = d, but it is straightforward to eliminate this assumption.
We begin by demonstrating the following result. Consider any feasible outcome (do, zo) with
d(, > d(w) and Eg(w- z=) = do. Let e'(do, zo,w) denote the set of outcomes. (d,az). with d- > d.
d- < d~(w), 0 z < ro, Ei(w - x)= d-, and
u:(d', z' | w) > ui(do,zo w)
for i = 1,2. Consider the subgame reached when contributions to date have been w - zo. Then for
each (d' , z) e (O(do, zcu). there exist strategies in the subgame which constitute a strong Nash
equilibrium of the agent-normal form with the outcome (d',x).
We construct these strategies as follows. Choose any A E (0. 1) and define z(d, x) by
ui(d+ zi, 2i w') = U (d-", z' w )
For any history in the subgame-that is, for any history since (d0 , zo) was reached-let
A min wi - r - t(h), z(k(h), t(h))7, if E(h) is odd;
P1(h)n(k0, otherwise.
and define p2(h) analogously except that contributions are not zero for even length histories. (We
take 0 to be an even number.) Let H denote the set of subgame histories consistent with these
contributions. That is, H is the set of subgame histories such that
Pm(h) = p(h'), Vm <(h)
where h' is the first m - 1 components of h. Then let the strategies in the subgame be
o- h) = fp;(h), if 
h E ZI;
0, otherwise.
To show that these strategies in the subgarne forrn a strong Nash equilibrium in the agent-
normal form. notice first that the strategies. if followed, define a sequence of outcomes which we will
denote {(d1 , zt)} for t = 0, 1,.... We clairn the following statements are true about this sequence.
First, for all t, for i= 1,2,
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Second .
(A.27) urn (dt,xt) = (d,)
The first statement is obviously true for t = 0. For all subsequent t, the utility of the agent who
did not contribute at t is clearly less than u (d', x w) because the other agent's contribution was
chosen to insure this. Furthermore, the same is true of the agent who did contribute. Recall that
we started where d = d(e). Hence for all t, the contributing agent's marginal utility is strictly less
than 1. Therefore, his utility, which started below ui(d, z| w). fell as a result of his contribution
and hence must satisfy (A.26).
We now demonstrate that (A.27) holds. Suppose it does not. The limit must exist since the
sequence of d's is an increasing. bounded sequence and the sequence of x's is a decreasing. bounded
sequence. Let the limit be denoted by (d, z) where we suppose (d', x-) = (d, x). By construction.
though. i > r' and d < d'. Hence if d = d', the fact that d must equal Z(w - zj) yields a
contradiction. Therefore, we must have d < d- and. for at least one i. ~z :>z But if this holds
for exactly one i. for that i. we will have u;(d, i ) > u (d-, x ;) which contradicts (A.26).
Therefore, we must have ~i > x for i = 1,2. But the only way this can hold is if zi(d.x^) = 0 for
i = 1, 2. Otherwise, the contributions would not be converging to zero. Hence we must have
Ui(d: ) - ~z; = Ui d' w)
for i= 1, 2, so that
i ii(d' w)+ w -d I= i(i w) w-d
Recall. though. that d' < d-(w) by assumption and that d' (s) maximizes 7 U (d w) -- E w - d.
The strict concavity of the utility functions implies that the function being maximized is strictly
larger at d' than at d if d- > d. Hence we have a contradiction. Therefore (A.27) holds.
The fact that (A.26) and (A.27) hold implies that these strategies form a strong Nash equilib-
riurn in the agent-normal form of the subgame. To see this, note simply that any deviation from
the equilibriurn path by any ih leads to an outcome strictly inferior for either agent than (d',.r ).
H-ence any history on the equilibriurn path has ih choosing a strict best reply to the strategies of
(ib). Consider any' history off the equilibrium path. If the game has not yet ended, the strategies
prescribe 0 for each agent. Notice that these strategies are again a strict best replies as the fact
that the current d must be at least d(w) implies that the best unilateral contribution is 0.
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We now see that from any outcome (do, zo) with do > d(w), we can reach any Pareto preferred
outcome without overprovision of the public good which has z < zo. Choose some (dc, zo) in
e 1(w), fix some d' such that there exists z' for which (d", z') E E'(d 0, zow). Consider the set of
zf such that (d, z-) E e~(d0,x 0,w). Since e(d°,z, w) is an open set. the set of such x' is open.
Hence no matter which x in this set we choose, there is another one which is worse for i. This
fact will prove convenient below. So choose any (d', z) E 8'(d-, zo, w). Construct equilibrium
strategies reaching (d", z') as follows. On the empty history, each person contributes tr1 - zo If
these strategies are followed in the first round, then assign the strategies constructed above which
lead to (d, x') for all subsequent histories.
To handle deviations from the strategies assigned for a history such that k(h) < do, we adopt the
following rules. First, whenever the deviation leads to h' such that k(h') > d(s). then set cru,, =()
for all i and all h" with h' as a subhistory. Multilateral deviations, of course. must be considered
even though they will not affect an agent's decision. We consider all multilateral deviations together
at the end. First. then, suppose that one agent deviated downward in the first round and let i
denote this agent. Choose a new equilibrium path from this history as follows. Let c_ A equal to
U; minus whatever i contributed so far. Let ori- ,h = 0. If followed, these strategies still lead to
(do. z0 ). Let
z= = inf{x (d',z) E 8' (do. zo, o)}2=
Choose a different outcome in E to end up at by leaving d unchanged and setting i 's wealth at
the final outcome to be x. - 3xz - zte for some 3 E (0. 112). By the definition of z;. this outcome
must be in e'. Notice, also. that 3 < 1/2 implies that the outcome defined by setting z; equal to
oc
k=1
is also in e~. If both players follow the strategies assigned from h to (d, z0 ), then choose the
outcome prescribed above and choose the strategies which lead to it. To cover deviations from this
path prior to reaching (do, x). simply adopt the following rules. As above, if the deviation leads to
some h such that k(h) > d(w), assign the strategies o'a = 0 forever after. Notice that if there is a
unilateral deviation by 2 - i. this must be true. Since 2- i is supposed to give 0 and i is supposed
to contribute so we reach (do, zo), if only 2 - i~ deviates, we rnust have k(h) > d, = d. Hence the
only other cases to consider are deviations downward by i and deviations by bo0th players. If onlyk
i deviated downward, adjust the strategies so that contributions at the next round take us to
(da. zo) anid alter the ultimate outcome by subtracting flk z, - z).where k is the number of' time ns
i has deviated. The case of multilateral deviations is handled below.
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Since what happens after multilateral deviations do not affect the incentives of the agents to
deviate unilaterally, we have more flexibility here. Suppose we have a multilateral deviation from
the sitrategies specified so far at. soie history h' satisfying k(h') d(w). Again, if this (1eviatioti
leads tco a history h with k(h) "d(w)., we set all contributions on any succeeding history to zero.
Suppose, then. that the deviations lead to a history h with k(h) < d(w). Choose any 4 such that
0 < z',4< w - t(h) and E(w - 4:,) = d(w). Let the outcome (d(w), 4) replace (d(w), zo) to imitate
the construction given above for the strategies following this history.
Consider the strategies so constructed. Clearly, after a history of length one consistent with
the equilibrium strategies, the equilibrium in the subgame is a strong equilibrium in the agent-
normal form. In fact, from any history h with k(h) > d. the same is true. This is because such
a history either has a deviation at the previous round or else it does not. In the former case. the
strategies have zero being contributed and we know that this is a strict best reply to the other
player contributing zero. In the latter case, we are following a path like those constructed at the.
beginning of this section and. again, these strategies are strict best replies to one another.
So consider the strategies assigned for any h for which k(h) < d. At this point. there is some
(dr,. zo-) that the strategies lead to and some (d', x) that the strategies lead to from there. Notice
that any unilateral deviation upward leads to a history with k(h') > d. Hence such a deviation leads
to an outcome strictly worse than (d,, zo) for the deviator and hence strictly worse than (d-,r').
Any unilateral deviation downward leads to an outcome better than (d. zo) but strictly worse for
the deviator than (d- z-). Hence the strategies proposed are again strict best replies. Therefore.
we have constructed strong Nash equilibria in the agent-normal form.
Hence we have shown that any outcome in O-'(d(w), x,w) for xsatisfying x > 0 and Z(w 1 - x) =
d(w) can be achieved by a strong Nash equilibrium in the agent-normal form. The fact that this
set contains outcomes with d < d'(w) immediately implies that there are outcomes not in Co,()
that can be reached. However, notice that this set also contains all Pareto optimal points which are
strictly Pareto preferred to some point which must be strictly individually rational for at least one
agent and individually rational for both. With only two agents, of course, the core is simply the set
of Pareto optimal. individually rational outcomes. Hence any point in the core except for one in
which some agent receives "too little" can be reached by such an equilibrium. In particular, if for
one i. dli(w) < d(w), we cannot achieve any point in the core too close to one yielding him only his
individually rational payoff. To be more precise, this construction does not yield such outcomes.
Whether or not they are possible is an open question.
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